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ABSTRACT 
 
Australia lacks a holistic instrument that protects human rights. Despite signing and ratifying 
many international treaties designed to protect human rights successive federal governments 
has failed to adequately enshrine these international obligations into domestic law. The 
current state of human rights protection in Australia is patchwork, representing potential 
failure to consider human rights in law making and policy development.  
The constitution does not serve to effectively protect human rights as this was not the 
intention of its drafters. The common law cannot directly protect human rights as it is 
subservient to the express will of parliament. The above factors highlight the dangers of 
lacking an overarching human rights instruments and the need to address its absence. A 
dialogue model human rights act created at the federal level would serve to provide better 
practice for protecting human rights in Australia through removing the parliamentary 
monologue that exists in interpreting and applying human rights standards.  
Existing human rights acts possess a commonality of human rights protected and mechanism 
of fostering dialogue. The human rights acts of New Zealand, The United Kingdom, Canada, 
Victoria, the A.C.T and chapter two of the South African constitution will provide guidance 
for developing a human rights act for Australia. They will also provide case studies against 
which the arguments for and against implementing a human rights act for Australia can be 
critically examined. Australia has its own unique separation of powers and constitutional 
system, therefore any legal challenges an Australia human rights acts would encounter will 
need to be examined in a more abstract and theoretical sense.  
This thesis will present an argument for the adoption of a federal human rights act for 
Australia. Such an act should be based on provisions in other acts which are likely to 
assimilate and survive legal challenge in an Australian context. A human rights act will 
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reduce criticism from human rights treaty monitoring bodies, allow Australia to participate in 
the development of international human rights jurisprudence and allow a better consideration 
of rights in the provision of public services. Legitimate criticism of dialogue model human 
rights instruments will also be explored in order to illustrate the counter arguments and their 
lack of probative value. This thesis will conclude that for the reasons discussed above 
Australia needs a human rights act in order to develop best practice for human rights 
protection.  
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Australia is one of the few remaining democracies to lack a holistic instrument that protects 
human rights, preferring to rely on the concepts of responsible government and representative 
democracy as methods of protection. This lack of protection becomes increasingly 
conspicuous when measured against various international treaties designed to protect human 
rights to which Australia is a party. This disparity between accepted international obligations 
and their domestic implementation represents the potential for Australia to become isolated 
from the developing international jurisprudence around human rights. The paucity of current 
rights protection coupled with examples of human rights violations further highlight the need 
to address this issue.
1
 
The constitution itself protects few rights serving largely as an instrument that delineates 
commonwealth heads of power, limiting the areas in which the federal parliament can 
legislate.
2
 Due to the lack of an express deceleration of rights there cannot be a definitive list 
of protected rights, however the most commonly agreed upon provisions are:  
- S 51 (xxxi) Acquisition of property on just terms 
- S 80 Trial by jury on indictment  
- S 92 Freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse among the States to be absolutely 
free 
- S 116 Freedom of religion 
- S 117 Freedom from disability or discrimination based on state residency,3 
 
                                                            
1 The most glaring examples being the suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (cth) and the 
allowance for indefinite detention under the Migration Act 1958 (cth) 
2 David Hume and George Williams, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 
2013) 113-14. 
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This limited list offers little in the way of direct individual protection. The High Court has 
also read in a number of implied rights into the constitution the most recognised being 
freedom of political communication, expressed in both Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills,
4
 
and Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth,
5
 and arguably inspired by the previous 
reasoning of Justice Lionel Murphy.
6
 
Since federation numerous attempts have been made to protect human rights through either 
constitutional amendment or statute, most resulting in failure. A referendum in 1944,
7
that 
would have created rights to freedom of speech, expression and religion in order to balance 
expanded commonwealth powers in a post-war environment was defeated. In 1988,
8
 a 
referendum to expand existing human rights in the constitution and extend them to apply to 
the states (trial by jury, freedom of religion and acquisition of property on just terms) was 
also defeated.
9
 The electorate has twice rejected the entrenchment of further rights into the 
constitution, both under different circumstances,
10
 illustrating the lack of support for a 
constitutional bill of rights.  
Two attempts were made to introduce legislative bills of rights in 1973 and 1985 however the 
first did not proceed beyond introduction and the latter lapsed amid intense scrutiny and 
opposition.
11
 One of the only major successful federal human rights initiatives was the 
establishment of the Human Rights Commission,
12
 in 1981, which was enacted with 
bipartisan support. The Australian Human Rights Commission is Australia’s national human 
                                                            
4 (1992) 177 CLR 1.  
5 (1992) 177 CLR 106.  
6 Michael Kirby, ‘Lionel Murphy and the Power of Ideas’ (1993) 18 Alternative Law Journal 121, 130-1.  
7 Constitutional Alternation (Post-War Deconstruction and Democratic Rights) 1944.  
8  Constitutional Alteration (Rights and Freedoms) 1988.   
9 Above n 3, 73. This was perhaps the most heavily defeated of all the referendums in Australia’s history. 
10 The 1988 referendum was preceded by a constitutional review which recommend the inclusion of a new 
chapter in the constitution dedicated to protecting human rights.  
11 Peter Bailey,The Human Rights Enterprise in Australia and Internationally (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2009) 
144-148. 
12 Later to become the Australian Human Rights Commission under the Australian Human Rights Commission 
Act 1986 (Cth). 
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rights institution that operates independently of the Australian government and investigates 
infringements of anti-discrimination legislation and makes limited human rights findings.
13
 
Rights in Australia are also protected indirectly through statutory interpretation by the 
common law principle of legality.
14
 When interpreting a statute a court will not impute an 
intention to abrogate basic individual human rights unless express language indicates this 
intention.
15
 The legislature would then suffer the political and public ramifications of 
abrogating fundamental human rights. Along with the human rights protected under the 
constitution and the various pieces of commonwealth anti-discrimination legislation, these 
three instruments represent the only methods through which human rights can be protected at 
the federal level.  
Human rights protecting under the constitution is minimal and they have been given limited 
scope through High Court interpretation. Legislative protection of human rights is patchwork 
and fails to domestically implement Australia’s various international human rights 
obligations. This thesis will argue that a federal Human Rights Act (HRA) is needed to 
address the inadequate protection of human rights in Australia. A dialogue model HRA that 
preserves parliamentary sovereignty,
16
 will better protect human rights, bring Australia into 
line with international human rights standards and create a culture of human rights in the 
public service. Such a model represents best practice for human rights protection in Australia 
that would not offend traditional notions of democracy and could be implemented in the 
foreseeable future.  
In presenting this argument the following instruments will be liberally consulted:  
                                                            
13 Above n 10, 352-4.  
14 Jennifer Corrin, ‘Australia: A Country Report on Human Rights’ (2009) 40 Victoria University of Wellington 
Law Review 37, 41.   
15 Alexis Henry-Comley, ‘The Principle of Legality: An Australian Common Law Bill of Rights’ (2013) 15 
University of Norte Dame Australia Law Review 83, 85-86. 
16 Melissa Castan and Paul Gerber, Contemporary Perspectives on Human Rights Law in Australia (Thomson 
Reuters, 2013) 34. Parliamentary sovereignty means, in a positive sense, parliament can legally pass any law 
and that no body or authority can compete or have superior legislative authority than parliament.   
10 
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- The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,17 
- Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) 
- Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) 
- Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) 
- Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT)  
There will also be scope, albeit more limited, to discuss these instruments:  
- International Covenant of Economic, Cultural and Social Rights,18 
- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 
- South African Constitution ch 2, South African Bill of Rights 
Chapter one will discuss the content and form of existing HRA’s, both international and 
domestic. HRA’s include an enumeration of specific rights to be protected, the requirement 
of legislation to be interpreted in a rights consistent manner and the ability of courts to issue 
declarations of incompatibility when a rights consistent interpretation is not possible 
(amongst other common features). The content of and experiences under other HRAs will 
help shape any potential Australian HRA.  
Chapter two will examine the potential legal challenges a dialogue HRA would meet in an 
Australian context. A declaration of incompatibility may not be an exercise of judicial power 
as it does not create binding rights or obligations on the parties involved. The interpretative 
scope allowed by a HRA may generate criticism of judicial activism due to Australia’s strict 
separation of powers. 
Chapter three will present and critically examine the arguments in favour of creating a HRA. 
These will include the reduction of criticism from international treaty monitoring bodies and 
                                                            
17 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 
3 January 1976). Hereinafter referred to as ICCPR. 
18 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Culture Rights (16 December 1966) 993 UNTS 3 (Entered 
into force 3 January 1976). Hereinafter referred to as ICESCR. 
11 
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greater consideration of human rights in the development of both legislation and policy. 
Ultimately a dialogue model HRA allows each branch of government to contribute its unique 
strengths to the dialogue that surrounds the human rights debate in order to create a best 
practice of human rights protection. 
Chapter four will present and critically examine the arguments against the creation of a HRA. 
The arguments include the suggestion that the current state of human rights protection in 
Australia is adequate, the possibility of undermining traditional parliamentary sovereignty 
and the potential for judicial activism. The purpose of this chapter is to identify and explain 
these arguments whilst illustrating their weakness when compared to the opposing arguments 
and their failure to become substantiated in other jurisdictions with HRA’s.  
Chapter five will suggest possible content and structure for an Australian HRA based on 
other HRAs, legal challenges a dialogue HRA would face and the various for and against 
arguments. This chapter will also discuss why Australia has failed to enact a HRA whilst 
exploring the disparity behind the public support for one and the political opposition against 
such an instrument.  The effect a potential HRA will have on administrative law will also be 
explored.  
In this thesis the term human rights refers to the positive individual rights that recognise the 
inherent dignity and autonomy of the human person. These human rights may exist outside 
the confines of the legal system or realised upon their creation by a legislative body.
19
 A 
discussion on the origin of human rights is outside the scope of this thesis but when 
mentioned the term refers to the human rights positively recognised in international treaties, 
most commonly in this paper ICCPR and ICESCR. The term HRA refers to a single statutory 
instrument which encapsulates all legislatively protected human rights (drawing from the 
above treaties) via which all other legislation can be examined for compatibility with 
                                                            
19 Richard Stone, Civil Liberites & Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2012) 4-5.   
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protected human rights. This instrument contains provisions which heighten the ability of the 
arms of government to protect human rights that will lead to a best practice of human rights 
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Chapter I: Common Features of a Human Rights Act 
Existing HRA’s contain many common provisions and operate in comparable fashion. This 
chapter will explore the workings of existing HRA’s and the commonality of protection 
mechanisms contained within them.  
 
 What Human rights are protected? 
HRA’s contain a list of enumerated rights that attract the protections offered in other parts of 
the instrument. Traditionally HRAs have only protected rights seen as civil or political in 
nature. Legislatures have been reluctant to allow judicial interpretation of rights that could be 
framed as economic, social or cultural.
20
 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK),
21
 was enacted to ‘bring rights home’, referring to rights 
that the UK had bound itself to upholding under the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) that could not be adequately determined by domestic courts due to this lack of 
adequate human rights legislation .
22
 The UKHRA in s 1 states that it protects ‘Convention 
Rights’ which are the rights laid out in articles two to fourteen of the ECHR excluding article 
thirteen which serves to provide an effective remedy for a violation (this was the purpose for 
enactment of the UKHRA). These convention rights are restricted to civil and political rights, 
23
 as Baroness Hale commented when considering the enactment of the UKHRA,
24
 ‘the view 
that the central purpose of the ECHR is to protect the individual against the misuse of power 
                                                            
20 A notable exception is chapter 2 of the South African Constitution which protects nine economic, social and 
cultural rights including access to adequate housing, health-care, food, water and social security 
21 Hereinafter UKHRA.  
22 Sir Gerard Brennan, ‘Introduction to Human Rights Law: Seminar Part II’ (2007) 81 Australian Law Journal 
248, 254.  
23 The ECHR grants rights to life, prohibition from torture, prohibition of slavery and forced labour, liberty and 
security, a fair trial, no punishment without law, respect of private and family life freedom of thought, conscious 
and religion, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, to marry and a prohibition against 
discrimination. 
24 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] 3 All ER 957, 972 [54].  
14 
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by the state’. The UKHRA also benefits all legal persons,25 be they natural or artificial so far 
as it is practicable.
26
      
The Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ),
27
 contains its protected rights in Part 2 which is titled ‘Civil 
and Political rights’. The BORA covers the rights contained in the ICCPR with its application 
fixed against actions done by the branches of the government. ICCPR protects a broad range 
of human rights similar to those covered in the ECHR and list the rights considered to be 
non-derogable (cannot be limited) in Article 4(2).
28
 The presence of the confusingly titled 
Human Rights Act 1993 (NZ) should also be noted which does not replace the BORA but 
serves as anti-discrimination legislation specifically targeted outside the public sector.
29
 Like 
the UKHRA the BORA applies to both individuals and corporations as s 29 prescribes the 
BORA as so far as practicable as benefiting all legal and natural persons. 
The Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT),
30
 is similar to the UKHRA in that it protects civil and 
political rights but not economic, social or cultural rights.
31
 The ACTHRA provides in s 6 
that only individuals have human rights therefore it does not protect corporations. Similarly 
the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic),
32
 serves to mostly protect 
rights of a civil or political nature and only applies to persons specifically stating in s 6 that 
corporations do not have human rights.  
 
                                                            
25 R v Broadcasting Standards Commission ex parte BBC [2001] QB 885, the UK Court of Appeal held that a 
company could have privacy rights. 
26 Pamela Tate, ‘Protecting Human Rights in a Federation’ (2007) 33 Monash University Law Review 220, 225. 
27 Hereinafter BORA 
28 The following rights are consider non-derogable: right to life, freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment and freedom from medical or scientific experimentation without consent, 
freedom from slavery and servitude, freedom from imprisonment for inability to fulfil a contractual obligation, 
prohibition against the retrospective operation of criminal law, right to recognition before the law and freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion.   
29 Above n 10, 185-186.  
30 Hereinafter ACTHRA.  
31 Brian Galligan and Emma Larking, ‘Rights Protection: The Bill of Rights Debate and Rights Protection in 
Australia’s States and Territories’ (2007) 28 Adelaide Law Review 185.  
32 Hereinafter VICHRA. Under s 19 of the charter the right to enjoy ones cultural, religious, racial or linguistic 
background is also protected whilst the distinct cultural rights of Aboriginal persons are specifically stated.  
15 
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Limitations on Rights 
Given that non-absolute rights may conflict and it is the responsibility of the parliament to 
‘balance’ rights in a democracy HRA’s often allow the limitation or derogation of certain 
rights whilst maintaining proportionality to a legislative or policy objective. This may be 
done through a general limitation provision applicable to all non-absolute rights or individual 
limitation provisions that are placed on specific rights    
The Canadian Supreme Court has developed an instructive proportionality test from 
consideration of s 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which provides that 
rights be only subjected to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.
33
 There must be a rational connection between the 
limitation and the objective, the limitation should impair the right as little as possible and 
there must be a proportional connection between the deleterious effect of a measure and the 
importance of its objective for the limitation to be justified.
34
 
Courts in the UK have developed a similar proportionality test to that which has emerged in 
Canadian jurisprudence.
35
 A legislative objective must be sufficiently important to justify the 
limiting of a fundamental right where the measures used to meet the objective are rationally 
connected to it and in impairing the right do no more than is necessary in achieving the 
objective.
36
 Article 15 of the ECHR allows the UK to make reservations and derogations 
                                                            
33 H P Lee, ‘A Federal Human Rights Act and the Reshaping of Australian Constitution Law’ (2010) 33 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 88, 99. 
34 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103, 139.  
35 Above n 29, 100.  
36 De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 1 AC 
69.    
16 
 
Ewen Mitchell 31820249 Honours Thesis 
from certain rights,
37
 in times of emergency. Derogation disregards a right completely while a 
reservation qualifies how a right will be protected.
38
 
The VICHRA in s 7(2) lays out a general limitation provision providing that rights can only 
be subject to reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society. In seeking to limit a right the legislature must take into account all relevant factors 
including:  
- The nature of the right 
- The importance and purpose of the limitation 
- The nature and extent of the limitation 
- The relationship between the limitation and its purpose 
- Any less restrictive means reasonably available to achieve the purpose the limitation 
seeks to achieve 
In this sense the limitation test broadly corresponds to the proportionality test identified in 
Oakes.
39
 The VICHRA also has a broad override deceleration under s 31 which allows the 
parliament to expressly declare that the charter not apply to a specific piece of legislation for 
a period of up to five years,
40
 which can be renewed at any time.
41
 This override declaration 
has been criticised as a flawed device as more serious safeguards apply to limitations on 
rights rather than the ability to completely override rights.
42
 Parliament may be tempted to 
                                                            
37 The non-derogable rights are the rights to life, prohibition to torture, prohibition to slavery and forced labour 
and no punishment without law. 
38 Above n 20, 48.  
39 Re Application under the Major Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 2004 [2009] VSC 381, 147-148. It would 
seem that Canadian jurisprudence surrounding proportionality has been influential on the relevant provisions in 
both the UKHRA and VICHRA. 
40 s 31(7) 
41 s 31(8).  
42 Julie Debeljak, ‘Balancing Rights in a Democracy: The Problems with Limitations and Overrides of Rights 
Under the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006’ (2008) 32 Melbourne University 
Law Review 422, 452.   
17 
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use the broad override declaration rather than limit individual rights as that method removes 
the judicial oversight on the human rights impact of legislation.  
Another useful guide on limiting rights comes from the Siracusa Principles developed by the 
UN Commission on Human Rights.
43
 This document provides definitions on what limitations 
and derogations of rights can be considered reasonable when applied in a non-arbitrary 
manner. Limitations on specific rights must be proportionate to achieving a legitimate 
objective which the principles provide must be prescribed by law, reasonable in a democratic 
society and for the promotion of:  
- Public Order 
- Public Health 
- Public Morals 
- National Security 
- Public Safety 
- Rights and Freedoms of Others 
- Restrictions on Public Trial (to avoid prejudicial publicity that may harm the fairness 
of a trial)  
The principles also detail when rights can be derogated from in situations of public 
emergency which are defined in limited circumstances and must be strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation (proportionate).
44
 The non-derogable rights contained in Article 
4(2) ICCPR are reinforced by the principles which provide that they cannot be derogated 
from in times of public emergency.  
 
                                                            
43 UN Commission on Human Rights, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 28 September 1984, E/CN.4/1985/4.  
44 The existence of a state’s basic functioning and integrity must be threatened in all or part of a state, affecting 
the whole population in that area, so as to constitute a grave and imminent threat to the life of the nation (the 
situation cannot be one of economic difficulties)  
18 
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The Interpretation of Legislation 
The manner in which a HRA allows for other statutes to be interpreted by the judiciary is a 
controversial area to which the criticism of judicial activism is often attached. How much 
scope a court has in interpreting legislation to conform to human rights standards must be 
clearly identified lest the impermissible area of judicial legislation be entered.
45
 
The UKHRA provides in s 3(1) that in so far as is possible to do so, primary legislation must 
be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with convention rights. The case in 
which the House of Lords delineated between possible and impossible interpretations was 
Ghaidan v Mendoza.
46
 The House of Lords determined that neither parliamentary intention 
nor the wording of the statutory text was the touchstone from which possible interpretations 
could be made. Instead interpretative possibilities were only limited by the underlying thrust 
of legislation measured against the intent of the parliament in enacting the UKHRA.
47
 
Moving away from the modern approach of statutory interpretation with regards to 
parliament’s intention,48 the UKHRA allows courts to ‘change the meaning of enacted 
legislation, so long as that change of meaning does not displace a cardinal principle of the 
legislation or exceed the bounds of judicial competence.
49
 The UKHRA has given Courts 
                                                            
45 Claudia Geiringer, ‘It’s Interpretation Jim but not as we know it: Ghaidqn v Mendoza, The House of Lords 
and Rights-Consistent Interpretation, (2005) 3 Victoria University of Wellington Human Rights Research 
Journal 1, 2.  
46 [2004] 2 AC 557. The House of Lords read in the words ‘as if they were’ in s 2(2) of the Rent Act 1977 (UK) 
which granted a statutory tenantship to a surviving spouse. The interpretation included same sex de-facto 
couples within the definition of surviving spouse overturning a previous decision in Fizpatrick v Sterling 
Housing Association ltd [2001] 1 AC 27. This new interpretation brought compliancy between the Rent Act 
1977 (UK) and Article 8 of the ECHR which protects respect for a private home which arguably the legislation 
was violating in respect to same sex de-facto couples.  
47 Above n 38, 13.  The intention of parliament in enacting the UKHRA had to be considered as the doctrine of 
implied repeal does not apply to it.   
48 John Burrows, ‘The Changing Approach to the interpretation of Statutes’ (2002) 33 Victoria University of  
Wellington Law Review 981, 988.  
49 Above n 38, 16 
19 
 
Ewen Mitchell 31820249 Honours Thesis 
significant scope to interpret legislation in a manner which conforms to protected rights even 
allowing established precedent to be overturned.
50
 
Under s 6 of BORA courts are required to give legislation meaning which is consistent with 
the rights protected by BORA whenever such a meaning can be given. In Quilter v Attorney 
General,
51
 the Court of Appeal could not interpret the Marriage Act 1955 (NZ) to include 
same-sex marriages as such an interpretation was clearly contrary to parliamentary intent and 
would have crossed the boundary into judicial lawmaking.
52
 The court emphasised the limits 
of its decision making noting that such a decision, relating to one of society’s fundamental 
institutions, was the in the proper realm of the parliament.
53
 In Moonen v Film and Literature 
Board,
54
 the Court of Appeal held that the words ‘promotes or supports’ be given a definition 
that least infringed freedom of expression given the intent of parliament under the Films, 
Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993 (NZ) was to create an objective test in order 
to determine what materials were objectionable under that act. In interpreting the BORA New 
Zealand courts have not been as adventurous as their U.K counterparts, displaying a 
reluctance to depart from modern statutory interpretation principles and interpreting 





                                                            
50 Above n 41. The previous decision in Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association ltd has ruled that the benefit 
offered to defacto couples under s 2(2) of the Rent Act 1977 (UK) could not be extended to same sex defacto 
couples living in the same circumstances.  
51 (1997) 4 HRNZ 170. 
52 Above n 43, 178. 
53 Petra Butler, ’15 Years of the NZ Bill of Rights: Time to Celebrate, Time to Reflect, Time to Work Harder’ 
(2006) Victoria University Human Rights Research 14.  
54 (1999) 5 HRNZ 224. 
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Declarations of Incompatibility 
Another common feature of HRA’s is the ability of courts (normally a senior court) to issue a 
declaration of incompatibility when a rights consistent interpretation cannot be given to a 
statute. These do not serve to invalidate legislation that infringes rights but function as 
dialogue between the judiciary and parliament communicating the judiciary’s opinion that a 
specific statute cannot be interpreted in a rights compliant fashion.
55
  
The UKHRA under s 4 allows a declaration of incompatibility to be issued by certain courts 
if a provision of a statute is incompatible with an ECHR right.
56
 Between October 2000 and 
2007 21 decelerations were made, 12 of which were addressed by legislation, amendment or 
remedial order in order to resolve the identified incompatibility.
57
 This represents how 
dialogue from the courts can initiate systemic reform to better protect rights.
58
 It is important 
to note that this mechanism is not intended as an effective remedy for litigants/complaints.
59
 
However it represents longer term potential change for the legislature to address the 
identified inconsistency through formal response and public scrutiny.
60
 It directs the 
parliaments notice to a human rights issue it may have overlooked. The most effective 
remedy for a litigant will be a rights compliant interpretation of a provision in question.  
                                                            
55 Dominique Dalla-Pozza and George Williams, ‘The Constitutional Validity of Declarations of Incompatibility 
in Australian Charters of Rights’ [2007] Deakin Law Review 1, 3.   
56 UKHRA s 4(5) provides that the Supreme Court, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the Court 
Martial Appeal Court, the High Court or Court of Appeal and the High Court of Justiciary may make 
declarations of incompatibility.  
57 Alice Rolls, ‘Avoiding Tragedy: Would the Decision of the High Court in Al-Kateb have been any different if 
Australia has a Bill of Rights like Victoria’ (2007) 18 Public Law Review 119, 135-9.  
58 Gabrielle McKinnon and Helen Watchirs, ‘Five Years Experience of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT): 
Insights for Human Rights Protection in Australia’ (2010) 33 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1, 
161. 
59 Lady Justice Arden, ‘The Interpretation of UK Domestic Legislation in the Light of European Convention on 
Human Rights Jurisprudence’ (2004) 25 Statute Law Review 165, 167. It has been described as a ‘booby prize’ 
for litigants.  
60 Above n 49, 169 
21 
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The power to issue a declaration of incompatibility (or declaration of inconsistent 
interpretation under the VICHRA) has been used more sparingly in both the ACT,
61
 and 
Victoria under the HRAs in these jurisdictions.
62
 Whether such a mechanism would be 
constitutionally valid in a federal HRA will be discussed in Chapter II paying close attention 
to experiences under the VICHRA given how other instruments may be of limited application 
to Australia due to our strict separation of powers.
63
 
BORA contains no provision that allows for a Court to make a declaration of incompatibility. 
However in Moonen,
64
 the Court of Appeal stated that it had the power to make a declaration 
of statutory inconsistency which was reaffirmed by Justice Thomas in R v Poumako.
65
 The 
NZ parliament responded with the Human Rights Amendment Act 2001 (NZ) which allows 
the Human Rights Review Tribunal and other courts, on appeal, to make declarations of 
incompatibility in regards to s 19 of BORA (freedom from discrimination). This style of 
judicial activism should not be unwelcome as it represents the judiciary filling gaps in 
incomplete human rights legislation also noting that the New Zealand parliament was 








                                                            
61 A deceleration was first sought in SI v KS (2005) 195 FLR 151.  
62 First deceleration granted in Momcilovic v The Queen [2010] VSCA 50.  
63 Stefanie Wilkins, ‘Constotutional limits on Bills of Rights Introduced by a State of Territory’ (2007) 35 
Federal Law Review 431, 437.  
64 Above n 46. 
65 (2000) 5 HRNZ 652.  
66 Above n 45, 10-12. 
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Role of the Legislature 
Another objective of a dialogue HRA is to increase the level of parliamentary scrutiny around 
the human rights impact of proposed legislation. This mechanism acts to stimulate 
parliamentary debate and protect rights upon which legislation might unreasonably infringe.
67
 
The creation of a parliamentary committee whose role is to scrutinise all proposed bills 
against the framework of rights protected in the relevant HRA would be expected to meet this 
objective. This framework is critical as without it a committee would lack the necessary 
guidance as to what rights should be protected and the circumstances in which they can be 
legitimately limited.
68
 In the UK this role is filled by the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
which contains both members of parliament and independent experts whose reports have 
induced changes in draft legislation,
69
and systematically influenced the preparation of 
legislation to be more aware of human rights.
70
 
Along with the considerations provided by the relevant committee any proposed legislation 
requires a compatibility statement from the member introducing it. This statement either 
provides a proposed bill is compatible with the rights protected under a HRA or details that 
the proposed legislation is incompatible with protected rights.
71
 If the member’s statement 
expresses incompatibility then it must stipulate the nature and extent of incompatibility. Both 
these mechanisms are likely to cause the legislative impact on human rights to be identified 
and adequately considered at an early stage of statute development.
72
 Under BORA it is the 
                                                            
67 Edward Santow, ‘The Act that Dares not Speak its Name: The National Human Rights Consultation Report’s 
Parallel Roads to Human Rights Reform’ (2010) 33 University of New South Wales Law Journal 8, 24-25.  
68 Carolyn Evans and Simon Evans, ‘Australian Parliaments and the Protection of Human Rights’ (2007) 47 
Papers of Parliament 17.  
69 Michael Tolley, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Rights in the United Kingdom: Accessing the Work of the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights’ (2009) 44 Australian Journal of Political Science 41, 52-3. 
70 David Feldman, ‘The Impact of Human Rights on the UK Legislative Process’ (2004) 25 Statute Law Review 
91, 94.  
71 VICHRA s 28.  
72 Above n 23, 227.  
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attorney general, not the individual member introducing a bill, who brings to the attention of 
parliament identified human rights inconsistencies in proposed legislation.
73
 
The final role of the legislature in the circular dialogue process is its responses to any 
decelerations of incompatibility that emanates from the judiciary when they interpret 
legislation to unreasonably limit protected human rights. Under s 37 of the VICHRA within 
six months of a declaration of inconsistent interpretation the minister responsible for the 
introduction of the human rights inconsistent provision must prepare a written response and 
lay it before both houses of parliament with said declaration and cause both documents to be 
published in the government gazette. Ultimately the government may choose to amend the 
inconsistent legislation or retain the inconsistency as the dialogue model preserves 
parliamentary supremacy. However this public reporting process serves to increase the 





 Role of the Executive 
The executive can be defined as the branch of government applies and enforces the laws 
made by the legislature and interpreted by the judiciary. While independent from the 
judiciary senior members of the executive may also serve as members of parliament but will 
be accountable before the legislature for their actions in the executive. The executive plays a 
critical role in the dialogue model HRA as it is the branch of government that provides public 
services and is most likely to interact with groups or individuals whose rights are in the 
                                                            
73 BORA s 7.  
74 Above n 16, 63-4. 
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greatest need of protection. The executive or anyone acting on its behalf must therefore be 
obliged to comply with the framework of rights set out in a HRA.
75
 
The obligation on public authorities to act in compliance with protected rights has been called 
the ‘cornerstone’ of the UKHRA.76 While parliament may exclude itself from the operation 
of a HRA as it may be required to limit rights at times whilst adhering to proportionality,
77
 it 
must possess the legal means to compel public authorities to respect human rights due to the 
high degree of interaction they have with the public.
78
 
The executive and public authorities must act in a manner that is compatible with human 
rights as well as accounting for human rights obligations in their decision making.
79
 This 
obligation would likely have an impact on administrative law. The rights covered in a HRA 
framework may require proper consideration in a more onerous manner due to their express 
requirement for consideration in decision making.
80
 The manner in which the obligations on 
the executive under a federal HRA would influence judicial review will be further discussed 
in chapter V.  
The definition of public authorities needs to be broad in order to capture not only public 
servants and statutory bodies but also all entities that discharge functions of a public nature. 
This would allow a HRA to extend to obligating private corporations to which the executive 
contracts out the provision of public services to act compatibly with human rights and 
account for human rights in their decision making.
81
 
                                                            
75 Above n 58, 17. 
76 Lord Bingham, ‘Dignity, Fairness and Good Government: The Role of a Human Rights Act’ (2009) 34 
Alternative Law Journal 74, 75.   
77 The UKHRA exclude both houses of parliament, s 6.  
78 Above n 58, 18.  
79 VICHRA s 38 and ACTHRA s 40B(1)(b).  
80 Julie Debeljak, ‘Human Rights Responsibilities of Public Authorities under the Charter of Rights’ 
(Presentation delivered at the law institute of Victoria Charter of Rights Conference, Melbourne, 18 May, 2007) 
<http://www.hrlc.org.au/files/XRA1F9XVTJ/Debeljak%20%20Obligations%20of%20Public%20Authorities.pd
f>   
81 Above n 23, 227. 
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Remedies Available 
What remedies should be made available when the executive fails to act compatibly or fails 
to consider the framework of rights under a HRA has been an area of serious contention. The 
main controversy has come from debate over whether public law or statutory damages should 
be available. It should be noted that a dialogue HRA priorities the prevention of human rights 
infringements via its various mechanisms over the provision of traditional remedies for 
individuals who are victims of human rights violations.
82
 
BORA does not provide for any remedies should a court find that a protected right has been 
unreasonably infringed.
83
 Available remedies have instead been developed by the Court of 
Appeal as envisaged in article 2(3)(b) of ICCPR.
84
 In Baigent’s Case,85 the Court of Appeal 
created a remedy of damages for infringement of BORA which parliament chose not to 
curtail, accepting a report of the Law Commission that this remedy should be left to develop 
judicially.
86
 The Court of Appeal had continued to award damages for violations of BORA 
rights including restriction of free movement, arbitrary arrest and unreasonable search and 
seizure.
87
 The Court of Appeal also found that under BORA it had the ability to develop 




UK courts have recognised that despite non-monetary orders (decelerations or injunctions) 
providing a sufficient remedy to human rights infringements public policy demands that 
                                                            
82 Irina Kolodizner, ‘The Charter of Rights Debate: A Battle of the Models’ (2009) 16 Australian International 
Law Journal 219, 229.  
83 Above n 48, 8. 
84 This article provides any person claiming a remedy shall have the right to have it determined by a competent 
authority and the development of possible judicial remedies to their complaint. 
85 Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent’s Case) (1994)1 HRNZ 42, 73. 
86 New Zealand Law Commission Crown Liability and Judicial Immunity: A Response to Baigent’s Case and 
Harvey v Derrick (NZLR R37, Wellington, 1997) 26-9.  
87 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2005) ch 27.  
88 Above n 48, 12. 
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monetary compensation is required for wrongs to be properly remedied.
89
 The UKHRA 
specifically allows for the award of damages, s 8(2). The ACTHRA contains no freestanding 
remedy to monetary compensation, however two sections provide for the award of 
compensation when their specific right is violated.
90
 In the case of Morro v Australian 
Capital Territory,
91
 it was held that these sections were not declaratory in nature but created 
an independent right to compensation that stood outside the normal common law remedy.
92
 
The VICHRA does not contain a general remedy of compensation nor does it grant a remedy 
of damages under specific sections.  
Ultimately the allowance for monetary compensation under a HRA (either developed 
judicially or provided for in the instrument itself) should be influenced by the general 
comment of the United Nations Human Rights Committee which summarised that the 
obligation to provide an effective remedy to a violation of ICCPR rights will generally 
require the payment of appropriate compensation.
93
 A HRA that lacked such a mechanism 
would not demonstrate adherence to the rule of law and would be self-defeating given that 
the enactment of a federal HRA should show commitment to domestically implementing 
international human rights jurisprudence.  
Another element of HRA’s is whether they include a free-standing cause of action. A free-
standing or stand-alone provision in a HRA allows a claimant to bring an action against 
infringement of a protected right without the need for an additional cause of action. McHugh 
advocated a charter of rights that limited individual claims to those already established at law 
as the protection offered by HRAs is derived from the immunities they provide not the 
                                                            
89 Gorringe v Calderale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057, 1057. 
90 Compensation for unlawful detention s 18(7) and compensation for wrongful conviction s 23(2). 
91 (2009) 168 ACTR 1. 
92 Above n 49, 159.  
93 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 32 [80] The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) [16].  
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establishment of causes of action.
94
 The VICHRA does not provide for stand-alone actions 
and there must be an additional cause of action for claims to be made under the charter. This 
would normally come from administrative law, such as failing to consider protected human 


















                                                            
94 Michael McHugh, ‘A Human Rights Act, The Courts and The Constitution’ (2009) 11 Constitutional Law 
and Policy Review 86, 9.  
95 Above n 16, 162. 
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Chapter II: Challenges to an Australian HRA 
In the previous chapter common features of existing HRAs were discussed paying attention 
to those that would provide relevant guidance in implementing a federal HRA for Australia. 
This chapter will focus on the challenges some of these provision would face due to the 
constraining influence of the separation of powers imposed by the constitution and potential 
conflict between state and federal jurisdictions.  
 
Validity of Declarations of Incompatibility 
The High Court considered the validity of this mechanism in the case of Momcilovic v R,
96
 in 
which an appeal from the Victorian Supreme Court was made concerning s 5 of the Drugs, 
Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (Vic) (Drugs Act) which was a deeming 
provision that effectively reversed the presumption of innocence protected by s 25(1) of the 
VICHRA.
97
 The applicant was originally convicted in the Victorian County Court for 
trafficking in a drug of dependence under s 5 of the Drugs Act which deemed her in 
possession of the drug unless she proved to the court otherwise. The Victoria Supreme Court 
issued a declaration of inconsistent application under s 36(2) of the charter as the infringing 
section of the Drugs Act could not be read as compatible with the protected right of the 
presumption of innocence.  
The appeal to the High Court was successful,
98
 however the declaration of inconsistent 
interpretation was set aside as it infringed the separation of powers, specifically the 
                                                            
96 (2011) 280 ALR 221.  
97 Will Bateman and James Stellios, ‘Chapter III of the Constitution, Federal Jurisdiction and Dialogue Charters 
of Human Rights’ (2012) 36 Melbourne University Law Review 1, 4. 
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Boilermakers doctrine.
99
 The VICHRA survived invalidation but its constitutional validity as 
well as that of any potential federal HRA was damaged.
100
 All members of the court held that 
a declaration of inconsistent application does not represent an exercise of judicial power as it 
has no impact on the legal rights of the parties in dispute before the court.
101
 It could not be 
said to give rise or be referred to a matter of conferrable federal jurisdiction as it was not 
connected to an immediate right, duty or liability to be established by the determination of the 
Court.
102
 Importantly, however, Justices Crennan and Kiefel in dissent held that a declaration 
could be regarded as the exercise of power incidental to that of judicial power as it was ‘A 
statement or conclusion as to the interpretation of the Charter and the statutory provision in 
question’.103 As it is connected to the question of interpretation a declaration becomes 
determinative of a matter, which is a valid area to which federal jurisdiction can be conferred  
The reasoning of the High Court in Momcilovic indicates that decelerations of incompatibility 
may not survive as valid mechanisms in State and Territory HRAs let alone a federal HRA. 
Due to the non-binding dialogue nature of a declaration that does not affect the rights, duties 
or liabilities of the parties involved it may be argued that a deceleration has no bearing on the 
determination of the controversy before the Court.
104
 Alternatively a definition of what 
constitutes a ‘matter’ in broader terms than those provided in Re Judiciary may allow the 




 the High Court was to restate 
the rule in Re Judiciary  but omitted the requirement that the legal effect of a ruling had to be 
                                                            
99 R v Kirby: Ex parte Boilerrmakers Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254. Chapter III courts (including state 
courts exercising federal jurisdiction) can only exercise judicial powers or power incidental to the exercise of 
judicial power. 
100 Above n 85, 5. 
101 Above n 84, 257.  
102 Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257, 265.  
103 Above n 84, 390.  
104 Jim South, ‘The ‘Campaign for a National Bill of Rights: Would ‘Declarations of Incompatibility’ be 
Compatible with the Constitution’ (2007) 10 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 2, 3.  
105 Geoffrey Lindell, ‘The Statutory Protection of Rights and Parliamentary Sovereignty: Guidance from the 
United Kingdom?’ (2006) 17 Public Law Review 188, 206.  
106 (1991) 173 CLR 289. This case involved an appeal to the High Court on a point of law following a criminal 
trial that had been terminated by Nolle Prosequi. Due to the termination of prosecution and the appeal having no 
effect on the dismissal of the indictment there did not appear to be a ‘matter’ before the court. 
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immediate in order for it be in respect to a matter.
107
 The Court found that a ruling on a point 
of law was influential and binding in a practical sense in that it referred to the subject matter 




The High Court in Attorney General (Cth) v Alinta Ltd,
109
 reaffirmed that a matter could be 
found divorced from the immediacy of determining the rights, duties or liabilities of any 
parties to the controversy. These two decisions influenced Gageler to conclude:  
[These decisions] strongly support the view that the making of a deceleration of incompatibility will be 
characterised as an exercise of judicial power and that the fact the rights of neither party would be directly 
altered or affected by the declaration is of no consequence.110 
These two cases are encouraging in suggesting that a deceleration made in the course of pre-
existing proceedings may be considered a valid use of judicial power however it should be 
noted that both were pre Momcilovic and both determined a controversy between the parties 
involved (a declaratory order in Alinta and a ruling on a point of law in Mellifont).
111
 
However a declaration can be seen as going beyond a mere advisory opinion which was 
determined to not constitute a matter in Re Judiciary. A declaration of incompatibility 
involves a determination as to the consistency of disputed legislation against the framework 
of protected human rights in an existing conflict between the parties involved, individuals and 
                                                            
107 Helen Irving, ‘The Dilemmas in Dialogue: A Constitutional Analysis of the NHRC’s Proposed Human 
Rights Act’ (2010) 33 University of New South Wales Law Journal 60, 69.  
108 Above n 93, 305. 
109 (2008) 233 CLR 542.  
110 Stephen Gageler and Henry Burmester, ‘In the Matter of Constitutional Issues Concerning a Charter of 
Rights: Supplementary Opinions’, Solicitor-General Opinion Nos 40, 68 (2009), 26. 
111 Above n 94, 70-1.  
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the executive.
112
 The High Court has previously been prepared to offer declaratory relief in 
controversies where there is only an attenuated link to an immediate right or duty.
113
 
Arguably a declaration of incompatibility is also not divorced from the administration of the 
law as to render it determinative of a matter. Comparing the declaration mechanism to a 
situation where the constitutional validity of a piece of legislation is challenged, the law that 
is being administered in both situations is the law governing the controversy about the 
impugned law.
114
 Simon and Carolyn Evans commented that there is a distinct similarity 
between a declaration of incompatibility and applying to a court for a ruling that a statute is 
constitutionally valid; both serve to administer a law.
115
 
Given the divergent opinions on what actually constitutes a ‘matter’ it is difficult to predict 
whether a declaration of incompatibility in a federal HRA would constitute a use of non-
judicial power and therefore be unconstitutional. It has been suggested that including the 
requirement for the Attorney-General to be joined to a proceeding in which legislation is 
challenged as unreasonably restricting a HRA right would improve the chances of 
declarations of incompatibility being judged constitutionally valid.
116
 If a declaration was 
issued an available remedy to the parties would be to compel the Attorney-General to comply 
with the obligations contained in the HRA (tabling a response before parliament) which could 
be enforced by the issuing of an injunction.
117
 This would give the parties access to a right to 
be determined by the court, allowing declarations of incompatibility to fit within the narrower 
definition of what constitutes a ‘matter’.  
                                                            
112 Above n 47, 22.  
113 Croome v Tasmania (1997) 191 CLR 119. In this case a majority of the High Court referred to a right to a 
declaration of invalidity under s 109 of the Constitution provided that the claimiant had a sufficient interest to 
raise a justiciable controversy, 127.  
114 Above n 47, 22-3. 
115 Above n 68.  
116 Above n 29, 106 
117 Above n 98, 20.  
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 Despite the possibility of creating a binding remedy on the Attorney-General and the broader 
interpretations of what constitutes a matter in Mellifont and Alinta it remains uncertain that 
the declaration of incompatibility mechanism would survive constitutional challenge under a 
federal HRA given the High Court’s decision in Momlicovic. The Honourable Michael 
Mchugh summarised it well, saying:  
Although it will be a close run thing, I think that the better view is that the High Court will hold that the 
incompatibility provisions of the legislation are invalid unless the High Court can be persuaded to adopt a 
more radical and functional approach to what is judicial power and what is a matter for the purpose of 
Chapter III of the Constitution than it has done in the past.118  
 
The Interpretation Provision 
The potential for judicial activism is a common criticism of HRAs given that there is an 
unclear line between proper judicial interpretation and improper judicial law-making, the 
latter representing an erosion of parliamentary authority.
119
 There is no clear definition for 
judicial activism however this attempt by Campbell has good merit:  
(a) Not applying all and only such relevant, existing, clear, positive law as is available, and (b) making such 
decisions by drawing on his or her moral, political or religious views as to what the content of the law should 
be120 
However the interpretative provision of a HRA is phrased,
121
 it alters the common law 
position of statutory interpretation surrounding human rights,
122
 to one encompassing a strong 
                                                            
118Above n 90, 15. He was discussing the proposed New Matilda Bill which now appears to be defunct.  
119 Julie Debeljak, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty and Dialogue Under the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities: Drawing the Line Between Judicial Interpretation and Judicial Law-Making’ (2008) 32 
Melbourne University Law Review 422, 11.   
120 Tom Campbell, ‘Judicial Activism: Justice or Treason’ (2003) 10 Octago Law Review 307, 312.  
121 The BORA says a rights consistent meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning, s 6. The UKHRA says 
so far it is possible a rights consistent meaning must be read and given effect against primary and subordinate 
legislation. The use of the word must in UKHRA as opposed to that of preferred under BORA has a stronger 
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rebuttable presumption favouring human rights only abrogated by express statutory language 
that evidences parliamentary intention to limit protected human rights.
123
 The purpose of the 
interpretative provision in a dialogue HRA is to allow the judiciary to express its expert 
opinion on whether protected rights are being unreasonably limited whilst allowing the 
legislature to retain its sovereign law making power.
124
 A strong interpretive provision that 
favours human rights given that the jurisprudence of Teoh may have been somewhat 
weakened by Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs: Ex parte Lam,
125
 which 
represented a more cautious approach on the part of the High Court in considering 
international human rights standards.
126
 
The authority to create possible human rights compliant interpretations has caused the UK 
Courts to apply a broad discretion when interpreting legislation, however s 3 of the UKHRA 
does not allow for interpretations that contradicts the fundamental features of a statute.
127
 
Elements of parliamentary intention behind the legislation that apparently infringes human 
rights may be trumped by parliament’s intention in enacting the UKHRA as the doctrine of 
implied repeal does not apply to it.
128
 Ultimately the UK has surrendered a degree of 
sovereignty when it comes to legislating around protected human rights as it must defer to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights which has stewardship over the 
ECHR. The interpretations offered by UK courts have been bold and have crossed out of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
122 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273. Where legislation is ambiguous an 
interpretation consistent with international human rights obligations is only preferable to one that is consistent. 
123 Above n 39, 50.  
124 Avoiding the possibility of the judiciary developing an ability to override or invalidate legislation, leading to 
a potential politicising of the judiciary. This is a clear distinction from the American judicial monologue that 
was recognised in Marbury v Madison (1803) 5 U.S 137.  
125 (2003) 195 ALR 502.  
126 Wendy Lacey, ‘The End for Teoh? Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Lam’ 
[2011] University of New South Wales Law Review 46, 3.   
127 Francesca Klug and Claire O’Brien, ‘The First Two Years of the Human Rights Act’ [2002] Winter Public 
Law 649, 654.  
128 Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Unlocking the Human Rights Act: The Radical Approach to Section 3(1) revisited’ 
(2005) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 259, 269. The interpretative provision in the UKHRA applies 
whenever legislation was enacted, s 3(1). The same is true for the VICHRA as it applis to all statutory provision, 
s 32.  
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normal methods of statutory interpretation but arguably they have not crossed into the 
improper arena of judicial law-making as was initially feared.
129
 
The language used in BORA is different than that used in the UKHRA providing only that a 
rights compliant interpretation will be preferred only when it ‘can’ be given, s 6. This has 
been interpreted as requiring that a reasonable interpretation be given, one that does not offer 
a strained legislative interpretation.
130
 Arguably the different perspectives on interpretation 
offer by the NZ and UK Courts are not simply the product of the wording of their HRA’s,131 
but the context from which they were enacted. BORA was introduced as an ordinary statute, 
a watered down version of an intended constitutionally entrenched bill that met with public 
disapproval.
132
 While The NZ Court of Appeal has seized the initiative to create remedies 




The VICHRA contains an additional provision in its interpretation section that provides 
construing legislation as human rights compatible must be done in a manner that is consistent 
with their purpose, s 32(1). This additional requirement seems to be a codification of UK 
jurisprudence around the limits of interpretation which prevents a Court from defeating the 
‘underlying thrust’ of parliament’s intention in producing a rights compatible 
interpretation.
134
 This section confirms that the judiciary cannot abrogate the overriding 
intention behind legislation to the extent that an interpretation allows an occurrence that the 
                                                            
129 Danny Nicol, ‘Are Convention Rights a No-Go Zone for Parliament?’ [2002] Autumn Public Law 436, 442-
3.  
130 MOT v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 269, 272.  
131 Above n 38, 18. 
132 Claudia Geiringer, ‘The Dead Hand of the Bill of Rights? Is the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 a 
Substantive Legal Constraint on Parliament’s Power to Legislate’ (2007) 11 Octago Law Review 389, 389. 
133 Petra Butler, ‘Human Rights and Parliamentary Sovereignty in New Zealand’ [2004] 35 Victoria University 
of Wellington Law Review 341, 7. 
134 Above n 107, 50-1.  
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legislation clearly disallows.
135
 It is important to acknowledge the clash of intentions that 
may occur between a HRA and potential rights infringing legislation given that the doctrine 
of implied repeal does not normally apply to HRAs. The intention behind the enactment of a 
HRA should prevail to the extent that legislation be read expansively or restrictively, the 
reading in of words and the modification of words can be performed by Courts in seeking a 
rights compatible interoperation except in cases where to do so would defeat a fundamental 
feature of the legislation.
136
 This broad interpretative power is supported by understanding 
that rights consistent interpretation is the primary remedy offered under a HRA and failing to 
adopt a broad approach to interpretation will undermine the purpose behind this provision.
137
 
It is difficult to argue that the use of the word ‘consistently’ in the VICHRA creates a 
presumption that the judiciary favours the purpose of the infringing legislation over that of 
the charter.
138
 Such a position would undermine the ability of the VICHRA to provide an 
effective remedy. Article 2(3) of ICCPR requires that states provide an effective remedy for 
violations of rights. A narrow approach to an interpretation provision would not be in keeping 
with the international rule of law provided for by ICCPR, therefore interpretation provisions 
must be approached broadly to ensure that effective remedies can be provided.
139
 
The potential for a broad interpretation provision in an Australian federal HRA to create 
controversy and criticism is high. The public and media in Australia have been fervently 
opposed to the notion of judicial activism with the decision in Dietrich v The Queen,
140
 
denounced as unwarranted judicial interference and the creation of the implied freedom of 
                                                            
135 Pamela Tate, ‘Some Reflections on Victoria’s Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities’ (2007) 52 
Australian Institute of Administrative Law Reform 18, 28.  
136 Simon Evans and Carolyn Evans, ‘Legal Redress under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities’ 
(2006) 17 Public Law Review 264, 268.  
137 Above n 39, 41-9. A deceleration of incompatibility is by no means a complete remedy for the parties before 
the court (it is an element of dialogue) and issuing one should be a last resort for a Court.   
138 Above n 107, 52.  
139 Ibid, 54.  
140 [1992] HCA 57. 
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political communication lead the High Court to be criticised as acting beyond its proper 
function.
141
 This level of criticism has reached an inappropriate and irresponsible level at 
times,
142
 and it seems highly likely it will remain and be refocused if a federal HRA was to be 
introduced. Despite this criticism a federal HRA would require a broad interpretation 
provision in order to fully implement Australia’s obligation to provide an effective remedy 
for human rights infringements. It is also important to note that judicial activism can be 
confused for judicial consensus which will often align to emerging public consensus about 




Heads of Power 
A federal HRA if faced with constitutional challenge would likely use the external affairs 
power,
144
 in order to defend its validity.
145
 The obligations imposed by ICCPR and ICESCR 
would likely form the content of a federal HRA. Despite being a party to these treaties 
Australia operates a dualist approach to international law and provision of accepted treaties 
will not have binding legal effect until they are mirrored in domestic legislation
146
.  The 
external affairs power is broad in scope however prospective legislation which attempts to 
domestically implement Australia’s international obligations must pass a characterisation test 
so that it conforms to the relevant treaty and carries its provisions into effect.
147
 The test for 
validity under the external affairs power was laid down in Victoria v Commonwealth: 
                                                            
141 Leslie Zines, ‘Judicial Activism and the Rule of Law in Australia’ in Tom Campbell and Jeff Goldsworthy 
(eds), Judicial Power, Democracy and Legal Positivism (Ashgate Dartmouth, 1999) 391, 395-6.   
142 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘No Place in a Modern Democratic Society for a Supine Judiciary’ (1997) 35 Law 
Society Journal 51, 1. At times it was argued that this criticism could be construed as inciting contempt of court.  
143 Justice Kirby, ‘Swearing in and Welcome Speech, High Court of Australia’ (1996) Australian Law Journal 
274, 276. The consensus among the public and the judiciary in the earlier history of this nation that allowed for 
the unequal treatment of non-white Australians has long been abandoned. 
144 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) s 51(xxix).   
145 Above n 29, 93.  
146 Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168, 193.  
147 Tasmanian Dams Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 131.  
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When a treaty is relied on under s 51(xxix) to support a law, it is not sufficient that the law prescribes one of 
a variety of means that might be thought appropriate and adapted to the achievement of an ideal. The law 
must prescribe a regime that the treaty has itself defined with sufficient specificity to direct the general 
course to be taken by the signatory states.148 
Whilst rights under the ICCPR are specific in nature there is concern that the implementation 
of ICESCR into a federal HRA could be more problematic as they are phrased in general 
terms and may lack the required sufficient specificity.
149
 This concern is debatable given the 
expansive interpretation with which the High Court has defined the external affairs power 
and the reticent expressed by certain justices against reversing this broad reading.
150
 
Arguably some of the rights encapsulated in ICESCR contain the sufficient specificity in 
their wording in order to direct a general course towards protecting them domestically. 
Article 6(1) of ICESCR recognises the right to work while Article 6(2) provides a number of 
steps to be taken in the full realisation of this right which include the provision of technical, 
vocational and training programs. It would seem that the wording of this Article would meet 
the test for sufficient specificity required by the external affairs power for treaty obligations 
to be carried into domestic legislation. Arguably at least some of the rights framed under 
ICESCR could be included in a federal HRA if they conform to the test of sufficient 
specificity. 
 
                                                               Federalism 
The federal nature of Australia’s political landscape may create barriers that prevent a federal 
HRA from effectively protecting the human rights of all Australians. Federalism seeks to 
protect against centralisation of power and encourage regional diversity yet it prevents human 
                                                            
148 Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, 418.  
149 Above n 98, 36.  
150 Above n 132, 572. Justice Dawson stated ‘Considerations of practicality make it necessary that the law 
should, as far as possible, take a consistent course. The constant re-examination of concluded questions is 
incompatible with that aim’. 
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rights instruments at one level of government from benefiting others.
151
 A federal HRA that 
applies to the states may also violate the doctrine of implied governmental immunities if it 
restricts or burdens the states in the exercise of their constitutional powers.
152
 
The National Human Rights Consultation Committee (NHRCC) recommended in its 2009 
report that a federal HRA should not extend to state and territory authorities.
153
 The logic 
behind this recommendation is that imposing binding legal obligations on the states and 
territories would likely generate significant public opposition and without it they would be 
free to pursue their own approaches to human rights protection.
154
 
This approach would not allow uniform human rights jurisprudence to develop in 
Australia,
155
 especially considering State Courts hear the bulk of criminal matters where 
human rights issues are most often raised.
156
 How non-uniform the development of the 
singular common law would be under federal HRA is debatable given that s 39(2) of the 
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) invests State Courts with federal jurisdiction in certain matters. A 
federal HRA could be drafted so that when State Courts are exercising federal jurisdiction or 
state jurisdiction when federal jurisdiction could have been invoked they will be required to 
                                                            
151 James Stellios, ‘Federal Dimensions to the ACT Human Rights Act’ (2005) 47 Australian Institute of 
Administrative Law Forum 33, 39.  
152 Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185, 258. The interpretation of state laws consistently with 
protected human rights, the tabling of ministerial compatibility statements and parliamentary human rights 
committees may be a burden on states constitutional powers.  
153 National Human Rights Consultation Report (2009), Recommendation 20. This opinion was also expressed 
by the then Solicitor-General, Stephen Gageler, in Appendix E of the report.   
154 Justin Gleeson, ‘A Federal Human Rights Act- What Implications for the States and Territories?’ (2010) 33 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 110, 110-1.  
155 Carolyn Evans and Simon Evans, Australian Bills of Right: The Law of the Victorian Charter and the ACT 
Human Rights Act (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008) 155-6. Australia has a singular common law with the High 
Court at its hierarchal zenith. It would be inappropriate for state or territory courts to develop the common law 
in respect to their individual HRA as this would fracture the notion of uniform common law development.  
156 Ibid 132. The United Nations Human Rights Committee have expressed the view that federalism should not 
exclude the provision of an effective remedy for a human rights violations which is an obligation at international 
law.   
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develop the singular common law in accordance with the rights protected under a federal 
HRA.
157
   
An alternative would be to have a federal HRA apply equally across all jurisdictions in 
Australia. This holistic approach would serve to better protect rights and not threaten non-
uniform development of the common law. Such an approach would not be in keeping with 
the purpose of the dialogue model as s 109 of the Constitution would serve to invalidate state 
laws that are inconsistent with the federal HRA whereas inconsistent federal laws would 
remain valid due to retention of parliamentary supremacy in the chosen model.
158
 Whatever 




Another option for achieving uniform human rights protection across all Australian 
jurisdictions may be for the states to refer their power to legislate over human rights to the 
commonwealth government under s 51(xxxvii) of the Constitution. When powers are referred 
they will be read in a narrow fashion,
160
 and may be limited by an expiry period,
161
 therefore 
this method may not offer the most robust protection of human rights holistically across 
Australia. Another alternative to achieving uniform human rights protection may be the 
creation of a federal HRA which is then mirrored by state legislation. Given the lack of 
coercion over the states and enormous political will required from all state governments in 
achieving this option it seems highly unlikely that it would succeed.  
 
                                                            
157 Above n 136, 132-3. This would not give State Courts the ability to develop the common law in reference to 
a federal HRA in all matters before it.  
158 Rosalind Dixon, ‘A Minimalist Charter of Rights for Australia: The UK or Canada as a Model’ (2009) 37 
Federal Law Review 335, 361.  
159 The essence of the dialogue model could be slightly more retained if parliament expressed that it did not 
intend to cover the field with a federal HRA (Clyde Engineering Co Ltd v Cowburn (1926) 37 CLR 466) so that 
only state laws that were directly inconsistent would be rendered invalid.  
160 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 208 
161 The Queen v Public Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal (Tas.); Ex parte Australian National Airways Pty 
Ltd (1964) 113 CLR 207.  
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Chapter III: The Arguments for a HRA 
This chapter will focus on discussing the main arguments in favour or creating a federal HRA 
for Australia. Specifically these arguments address the advantages a HRA can deliver mainly 
improved methods of human rights protection and commitment to the internationally 
recognised standards of human rights protection. A Federal HRA would improve the 
domestic protection of human rights in the key areas:  
- The formulation of new laws 
- Directing the conduct of public authorities  
- Interpretation of other legislation, both existing and future.162 
 
A Fill in Gaps: 
Despite possessing (by comparison) a decent human rights record there is significant scope 
for improvement in the way rights are protected in Australia.
163
 Currently the main 
Commonwealth statutes that serve to protect rights are:  
- Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) 
- Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) 
- Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) 
- Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) 
- Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
- Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth).164 
                                                            
162 Edward Santow, ‘Impact of an Australian Human Rights Act on Refugee Law’ (2009) 16 Australian Journal 
of Administrative Law 183, 183.  
163 Above n 65, 15.  
164 Above n 65, 42.  
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While these acts domestically implement some of Australia’s international human rights 
obligations they do not do so to the full extent required by their relevant treaties. This seems 
divergent to the enthusiasm Australia displayed towards human rights shortly after the 
Second World War by being one of the original signatories to the Universal Deceleration of 
Human Rights 1948.
165
  The four specific anti-discrimination acts fall short of protecting 
against ‘any’ form of discrimination as required by Article 26 of ICCPR.166 There is 
significant disparity between the protections offered by the international instruments to which 
Australia has acquiesced and the extent to which these protections have been domestically 
implemented. Anti-discrimination legislation has been narrowly drafted and therefore 
interpreted in a narrow manner by the Courts and has therefore failed to clearly define 
equality or provided achievable goals in realising equality.
167
 
These Acts are also fraught with exemption provisions, an example of which is s 37(d) of the 
Sex Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) which allows for discrimination on the basis of gender in 
relation to the practices of a body established for religious purposes.
168
 Such an exemption 
seems contrary to the text of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women which calls on parties to take appropriate measures to 
eliminate practices based on the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes.
169
 These 
Commonwealth acts may also conflict with similar states anti-discrimination legislation 
creating a lack of uniformity in rights protection.
170
 
                                                            
165 Francine Johnson and Edward Santow, ‘How Would an Australian Human Rights Act Impact Business’ 
(2010) 38 Australian Business Law Review 7, 7.  
166 Elizabeth Evatt, National Implementation: The Cutting Edge of International Human Rights Law (Law and 
Policy Paper 12) (Centre for International and Public Law, Australian National University, Canberra, 1999) 20-
1.  
167 Above n 16, 164-5. 
168 Hilary Charlesworth and Sara Charlesworth, ‘The Sex Discrimination Act and International Law’ (2004) 47 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 21, 23-4.  
169 Convention on the Elimination of All Form of Discrimination against Women, Open for signature 18 
December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force September 3 1981), Article 5.  
170 Beth Gaze, ‘Context and Interpretation in Anti-Discrimination Law’ [2002] 26 Melbourne University Law 
Review 325.  
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The weakness of current legislative human rights protection coupled with the paucity of 
rights protection contained in the constitution indicates the need for a holistic HRA that 
‘rounds out’ these existing gaps. This ad hoc approach does not provide an effective check on 
executive and legislative power that may unreasonably infringe human rights, as Sir Anthony 
Mason commented:  
Human rights are seen as a countervailing force to the exercise of totalitarian, bureaucratic and institutional 
power- widely identified as the greatest threats to liberty of the individual and democratic freedom in this 
century.171   
This lack of holistic rights protection which gives potential to human rights abuses could be 
balanced out by the work of strong democratic institutions. Australia has an abundance of 
democratic institutions yet these may not be enough to ensure that human rights receive 
sufficient consideration and therefore adequate legislative protection.
172
 An example of this 
can be seen in the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) which reigned in rights affirmed in 
the Wik,
173
 case providing that the Racial Discrimination Act was not to operate when there 
was clear legislative intention that native title rights be overridden.
174
 A broad HRA that 
protected against all forms of discrimination may have prevented direct abrogation of native 
title rights, especially so soon after their realisation.
175
 The NHRCR received the suggestion 
for multiple submissions that Australia’s democratic institutions do not always work 
effectively to protect human rights citing examples of required mandatory detention for 
asylum seekers, the deportation or Australian citizens on migration grounds and restrictions 
on personal liberty imposed by anti-terrorism legislation.
176
            
                                                            
171 Sir Anthony Mason ‘A Bill of Rights for Australia’ (1989) 5 Australian Bar Review 79, 79. 
172 Margaret McMurdo, ‘An Australian Human Rights Act: Quixotic Impossible Dream or Inevitable Natural 
Progression’ (2010) 13 Southern Cross University Law Review 37, 10.  
173 Wik People’s v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1. 
174 George Williiams, A Charter of Rights for Australia (University of New South Wales Press Ltd, 2007) 45-6. 
175 A HRA would also have brought public attention to the suspension of native title rights and allowed judicial 
comment on the rights restriction imposed by the act. 
176 National Human Rights Consultation Report (2009), 265-6.  
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It is not submitted that a federal HRA would serve to prevent parliamentary erosion of 
existing or newly implemented rights as our traditional style of democracy requires that the 
supreme will of parliament not be abrogated. However an instrument that requires 
consideration of a broad range of human rights in the legislative process is likely to reduce 
restrictions on rights through increased scrutiny and accountability before the public. The 
absence of adequate parliamentary safeguards contained in Australia’s ad hoc system of 
rights protection increases the likelihood of human rights infringements.
177
 By removing 
complete consideration of rights from the parliament and allowing judicial comment, the 
protection of rights becomes independent of the political process and their consideration is 




Dialogue Improves Government Accountability 
A federal HRA would also serve to improve accountability of the legislature when it comes 
to necessary considerations of human rights in developing statute. The idea behind a dialogue 
model HRA is that it allows legislative response to Court decisions that involve 
determinations of human rights, hopefully motivating the legislature to achieve their original 
objective in a manner that is consistent with human rights.
179
 
 The presence of both parliamentary supremacy and monopoly over rights in the Australian 
democracy cannot be sustained as the best practice of rights protection.
180
 The judiciary 
                                                            
177 David Malcolm, ‘Human Rights- A Current Legal perspective’ (Delivered at the Human Rights and the 
Protection of Innocence Symposium 26 March 2004)  26-7 < 
http://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/_files/Human_Rights-Current_Legal_Perspective_%2026Mar04.pdf>.  
178 Terence Higgins, ‘Australia’s First Bill of Rights- Testing Judicial Independence and the Human Rights 
Imperative’ (Delivered at the National press Club 3 March2004)  
<http://www.courts.act.gov.au/magistrates/page/view/313#higgins> 
179 Peter Hogg, Allison Thornton and Wade Wright, ‘ A Reply on Charter Dialogue Revisited’ (2007) 45 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 193, 194.  
180 Julie Debeljak, ‘Rights Protection Without Judicial Supremacy: A Review of the Canadian and British 
Models of Bills of Rights’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 285, 2-3.  
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should be given a legitimate role to play in the protection of rights, utilising its expert 
skills,
181
 in the sense that parliament loses its monopoly over rights dialogue whilst retaining 
supreme legislative power.
182
 The skills of the courts come from applying general law to 
individual cases, paying attention to particular circumstances to ensure individuals are not 
unfairly prejudiced by law that is intended to serve the majority.
183
 Removing the 
parliamentary monopoly over human rights has been stated by the European Court of Human 
Rights to better protect minority rights:  
Democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must always prevail; a balance must be 
achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of the dominant 
position.184  
The benefit of having the judiciary participate in the dialogue around human rights is that the 
legislature will be able to reflect and respond accordingly when limitations upon protected 
rights are determined to be unreasonable. Judicial consideration of rights does not violate 
traditional notions of democracy, as Capelletti comments: 
Far from being inherently antidemocratic and antimajoritarian, rights emerge as a pivotal instrument for 
shielding the democratic and majoritarian principles from the risk of corruption. Our democratic ideal is not 
one in which majoritarian will is omnipotent.185  
An example of this dialogue is the legislature’s response to an interpretation the judiciary 
gives to legislation. If the parliament is unsatisfied with an interpretation the judiciary has 
given to a provision then it may choose to amend the relevant provision to specifically 
                                                            
181 Courts are more likely to consider the impact of legislation upon affected individuals who may have not been 
adequately considered in the majoritarian utilitarianism that parliament engages in. 
182 Above n 156, 2. 
183 Jeremy Webber, ‘A Modest (but robust) Defence of Statutory Bills of Rights’ in Tom Campbell, Jeffery 
Goldsworthy and Adrinne Stone (eds), Protecting Rights Without a Bill of Rights: Institutional Performance 
and Review in Australia (Ashgate, 2006) 263, 276.  
184 Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom [1981] ECHR 4, 63. The judiciary is in a far better position to 
recognise and protect human rights of individuals than the legislature is.   
185 Mauro Cappelletii, ‘Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and legitimacy of ‘’Constitutional Justice’’’ 
(1985) 35 Catholic University Law Review 1, 28. 
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preclude the first interoperation offered. However if the judiciary has identified a human 
rights infringement overlooked by the parliament then they may choose to leave the rights 
compliant interpretation intact. This can be seen in the NZ context where the Court of Appeal 
read in the remedy of damages to BORA which the parliament choose to let stand after 
consultation with the Law Commission.
186
 
The other dialogue that would occur between the judiciary and parliament results from the 
issuing of a declaration of incompatibility. Although not affecting the validity of the 
infringing legislation the declaration sends a strong public message to parliament that it 
should reconsider the encroachment on human rights it has created.
187
  
As of 31 July 2013 the UKHRA (which has been operating since 2 October 2000) has been 
used to issue 28 declarations of incompatibility of which 19 became final (not overturned on 
appeal). These 19 incompatibilities were responded to by the legislature in the following 
manner:  
- 11 were remedies by later primary legislation 
- 3 were remedied by a s 10 remedial order 
- 4 had already been remedied at the time the deceleration was made 
- 1 was under consideration for how to apply a remedy.188 
This high rate of response, divorced from any legal obligation to adhere to declarations of 
incompatibility, indicates that in the UK dialogue stemming from the judiciary has caused 
parliament to reconsider the effect enacted legislation has on human rights. Acceptance of the 
judiciary’s expert opinion and taking action to remedy incompatibilities reflects a legislature 
that is accepting of the advantages of the dialogue process. Due to the public profile attached 
                                                            
186 Above n 76.  
187 Lord Walker, ‘Problems of Human Rights Legislation: What Difference can a Human Rights Charter Make?’ 
(2007) 81 Australian Law Journal 923, 925.  
188 Report to the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the Government Response to Human Rights judgements 
2012-13, Ministry of Justice, 45.  
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to human rights a state must display a committed attitude to their protection (illustrated by 
engaging in the dialogue process) in order to justify itself to its citizens.
189
 Legislative 
structures that promote inter-institutional dialogue between the different branches of 
government are preferable to a parliamentary or judicial monopoly over human rights 
protections.
190
 Speaking about deficiencies in human rights protection in Australia, Debeljk 
was to comment about the rights monopoly held by parliament: 
[the representative arms of government have a monopoly over human rights] This monopolistic power places 
rights-protective common law and statutory rules in a precarious position, and allows the international 
human rights regime to be manipulated as it suits political fortunes. 
Dialogue is also generated through the mechanisms that increase scrutiny of bills in their pre-
legislative stage (parliamentary committee and tabling of report by responsible minister). 
This open and transparent consideration of the effect prospective legislation may have on 
human right may at least cause parliament to realise the deleterious consequences of potential 
statute. The hostile nature of parliamentary debate does not always allow for proper 
consideration of the eventual negative consequences legislation may have on individuals,
191
 
which may not become apparent until there is legal challenge through the courts. Senator 
Andrew Bartlett when speaking about the insertion of a private clause into the Migration Act 
in 2001,
192
 commented about the lack of appreciation that can surround law making: 
They probably wanted bad law; they might not have wanted very bad law. We probably got extraordinarily 
appalling law and we do not even know if we have got it yet. We will not even know for another year or two, 
until we finally get a High Court case about what the hell this privative clause means.193 
                                                            
189 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Intolerant Democracies: A Response’ (1996) 37 Harvard Law Journal 231.  
190 Julie Debeljak, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK): The Preservation of Parliamentary Supremacy in the 
Context of Rights Protection’ (2003) 9 Australian Journal of Human Rights 10, 2. 
191 John Steyn, ‘The Intractable Problem of the Interpretation of Legal Texts’ (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 5, 
13.  
192 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474. This privative clause reduced the access to judicial review in respect to 
migration and refugee determinations made under the act.  
193 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 June 2002, 3005.  
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The advantages of dialogue in encouraging additional parliamentary scrutiny and 
accountability is not limited to interactions between the judiciary and legislature. In the 
formulation of policy and the provision of public services the executive would also 
participate in the dialogue process, responding to human rights complaints from individuals 
and the Australian Human Rights Commission.
194
 Civil society would also be encouraged to 
engage in the debate surrounding human rights issues when HRA mechanisms are put in 




Improved Human Rights Protection 
One of the major arguments in favour of creating a HRA is that it will enable better 
protection of human rights, largely through the operation of the interpretative provision 
which creates a rebuttable presumption that legislation is to be construed in a rights compliant 
fashion. A federal HRA that encompasses Australia’s international obligations in domestic 




In Al-Kateb v Godwin,
197
 the High Court held in a 4:3 split majority decision that s 196 and s 
198 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) were unambiguous and required the indefinite detention 
of Mr Al-Kateb who was a stateless individual that no other country would accept. Such a 
finding was grossly inconsistent with Australia’s obligation under Articles 7,198 and 9,199 of 
ICCPR yet the majority of the High Court was unwilling to impute human rights compliant 
                                                            
194 Andrew Byrnes, Hilary Charlesworth and Gaberielle McKinnon, Bills of Rights in Australia: History, 
Politics and Law (University of New South Wales Press, 2009) 51-4. 
195 Above n 45, 170. 
196 Above n 53, 119 
197 (2004) 219 CLR 562,  
198 No one shall be subject to torture inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.  
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interpretation given the apparent express language of the statute with allowed for indefinite 
detention. The United Nations Human Rights Commission has indicated that when detention 
is carried out for immigration purposes and there is no prospect of removal in the foreseeable 
future it will constitute arbitrary detention, in breach of Article 9 of ICCPR.
200
  
Those in dissent (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ) found that the Migration Act 1958 
(Cth) was ambiguous as to whether an individual was to be held in indefinite detention when 
there was no real prospect of removal from Australia.
201
 Those justices were able to then 
favour an interpretation in keeping with Australia’s obligations under ICCPR using the 
jurisprudence of Minister of Immigration v Teoh and resolving that an intention to abrogate 
from a fundamental right was not present in the express wording of the legislation.
202
  
If Australia possessed a federal HRA it is likely that the result in Al-Kateb would have been 
different and produced an outcome that was not incompatible with human rights. The 
requirements for visa eligibility and detention under the Migration Act would have been 
construed in reference to protected rights,
203
 mainly the right to liberty. Under the UKHRA 
courts have been empowered to interpret unambiguous legislation in a human rights 
compliant fashion,
204
 willing to read down language but only to the extent it does not 
contradict the underlying thrust of parliament’s purpose in enacting the legislation.205 This is 
mirrored in s 32 of the VICHRA which does not require ambiguity before a human right 
interpretation can be offered. Looking at the Australian context Rolls commented that:  
                                                            
200 Baban v Australia, Communication No 1014/2001 (2003), 7.2. 
201 Above n 166, 575.  
202 Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427. The common law principle of legality prevents an imputation that 
legislation is to violate fundamental human rights unless express wording indicates the contrary. 
203 Above n 144. 185. 
204 Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Human Rights and Statutory Interpretation’ in Stephen Bottomley and Suzanne 
Corcoran (eds), Interpreting Statutes (The Federation Press, 2005) 114.  
205 In R v A (No 2) [2002] 1 AC 45 the House of Lords read down the language in a statute so as to only impose 
an evidentiary and not a legal burden against the adducing of evidence of a complaints sexual history in rape 
cases. It was held that a legal burden could infringe the accused’s right to a fair trial.   
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If the Charter had applied in the Al-Kateb case, the majority judges would not have been able to avoid 
considering human rights issues. They would have been required to interpret the relevant provisions of the 
Migration Act compatibility with human rights.206  
A federal HRA with an interpretative provision similar to that contained in the VICHRA and 
UKHRA,
207
 would allow the judiciary in Australia to do justice to human rights in a way not 
previously available.
208
 Such a provision allows the Courts to give stronger consideration to 
human rights,
209
 whilst allowing the legislature to retain its supremacy by positively or 
negatively responding to a Court’s interpretation. If the purpose behind the Migration Act 
was to efficiently process visa applications and removed failed asylum seekers from Australia 
then an interpretation that disallowed indefinite detention would not have frustrated this 
purpose.
210
 Such an interpretation would have been in keeping with the jurisprudence 
contained in the UKHRA and VICHRA and would have been obedient to Australia’s 








                                                            
206 Above n 53, 131.  
207 The interpretation provision in BORA and ACTHRA are arguably weaker and the NZ courts have been less 
aggressive in offering human rights compliant interpretations,  
208 Cachia v Faluyi [2001] 1 WLR 1966.   
209 An interpretation provision that requires Courts to consider human rights compliant interpretations in all 
circumstances not just in instances of ambiguous language codifies a strong human rights presumption. It is a 
stronger position than the offered in Minister of Immigration v Teoh. 
210 Above n 165, 133-4.  
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Creating a Culture of Human Rights 
Creating a federal HRA would also improve the consideration placed on human rights 
compliance by those who supply public services (normally the executive). Holding 
authorities to directly enforceable high standards will help prevent abuses of power and foster 
policy change in the public service that take into account the circumstances of individuals 
who are in most need of assistance.
211
 Governments utilise diverse organisational 
arrangements to manage and deliver public services,
212
 so rights should be enforceable 
against all those party to these arrangements in order to develop a complete culture of rights. 
The British Institute of Human Rights (BIHR) released a case study in 2008 examining the 
effect of UKHRA on the public service.
213
 The report cites multiple real life examples where 
consideration of the rights protected under the UKHRA by members of the public service 
resulting in the improved treatment of those in need. In the first case study an older woman in 
a care facility was strapped into a wheelchair due to staff fearing she would injure herself if 
unrestrained. A consultant indicated that such treatment could be considering degrading and 
may be contrary to Article 3 of ECHR, noting the distressed state of the woman. The staff 




In another situation a learning disabled schoolgirl was denied transport to school despite it 
being the policy of the local authority to provide this, potentially discriminating against her 
and breaching her right to respect for private life. After attending a BIHR training session an 
independent parental supporter encouraged the girl’s mother to challenge this decision using 
                                                            
211 Above n 136, 273-4.  
212 Explanatory Memorandum, Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Bill 2006 (Vic), p 4. 
213 British Institute of Human Rights, Changing Lives (2008).  
214 Ibid, 6.  
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rights based language and they were successful in having it reversed.
215
 Such case studies 
illustrate the real impact a HRA has on individuals in everyday situations by requiring those 
who provide public service to meet their positive obligations to act in a human rights 
complaint manner.
216
 A 2006 parliamentary review of the UKHRA supported the view that 
the quality of public services had been improved through the mechanisms in the act that 
require public authorities to consider the impact on human rights that their actions had.
217
 
Another way in which a federal HRA could further create a culture of rights would be to 
empower the Australian Human Rights Commission to review the effect of commonwealth 
legislation and the common law upon human rights. The ACTHRA in s 41 effectively gives 
the ACT Human Rights Commission,
218
 authority to conduct human rights audits particularly 
into closed areas in which the government has total control and where rights abuses might 
otherwise go unnoticed.
219
 Following an audit of the Quamby Juvenile Detention Centre in 
2006 the ACT Chief Minister, Jon Stanhope, was to comment:  
A perfect, practical example of a dialogue system at work. The process was conducted in such a 
collaborative way that by the time the final report was written, most of its recommendations had already 
been acted upon. This, surely, is a result worth any number of front-page Supreme Court judgements 
exposing rights abuses against juvenile offenders.220 
The ACT government responded to this report in February 2008,
221
 agreeing in full with 70 
of the 98 recommendations contained in the report. The changes implemented following the 
report, including using all available detention facilities to reduce overcrowding, should be 
                                                            
215 Above n 180, 15. 
216 Above n 180, 25-6. 
217 House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘The Human Rights Act: The 
DCA and Home Office Reviews’ (32nd Report, 2005-6) November 2006. 
218 Established by the Human Rights Commission Act 2005 (ACT) 
219 Above n 45, 163.  
220 Jon Stanhope, ‘ACT Human Rights Community Forum’ (Speech delivered at the Human Rights Forum, 
Canberra, 1 May 2006).  
221 ACT Government, Government Response to the Recommendations of the Report of the Human Rights Audit 
on the Operation of ACT Correctional Facilities under Corrections Legislation (2007).  
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seen as a positive contribution to human rights protection arising from inter-institutional 
dialogue.
222
 The ACTHRA has served as a catalyst for human rights audits providing a 
framework of protected rights against which territory legislation and institutions can be 
measured.
223
 This dialogue did not emanate from the judiciary but rather from an institution 
purposefully directed by the ACTHRA to measure human rights compliance, demonstrating 
that dialogue is not reserved for interaction between the Courts and Parliament.   
The creation or improvement of a human rights culture is critical for the success for any 
potential HRA. The rights protected by a federal HRA will be limited in operation unless they 
coexist with a supportive legal, political and cultural environment. An example of this can be 
seen in the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union which contained a bill of rights.
224
 
Operating in isolation this instrument could do very little to protect rights when the rights 
culture needed to support it did not exist.  
 
International Jurisprudence and Education 
Australia has become intellectually isolated from international trends in the development of 
human rights jurisprudence.
225
 Of all the nations that previously relied upon the common law 
to protect human rights Australia remains alone in placing faith in this rebuttable method of 
protection. This is a difficult position to justify given other nations with similar legal systems 
have adopted human rights instruments that afford a better standard of rights protection.
226
 
Australia is a party to the First Optional Protocol under ICCPR which provides an individual 
complaints mechanism which investigates claims that individual’s rights under ICCPR have 
                                                            
222 Above n 45, 165.   
223 Above n 45, 164-5.  
224 George Williams, A Charter of Rights for Australia (University of New South Wales Press Ltd, 2007) 87. 
225 James Spigelman, ‘Access to Justice and Human Rights Treaties’ (2000) 22 Sydney Law Review 141, 150.   
226 David Malcolm, ‘A Human Rights Act for Australia’ (2006) 8 University of Norte Dame Australia Law 
Review 9, 27-8.  
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been violated by a member state. The ability of this protocol to provide an effective remedy is 
questionable as it does not produce a binding resolution on the offending state. Malcolm 
commented that ‘that the best an aggrieved Australian can hope for is a short-lived 
international embarrassment for the government’.227 Arguably the only positive effect this 
mechanism had on Australian law was from the case of Toonen v Australia.
228
 
This approach is out of keeping with current jurisprudence surrounding the right to a remedy 
under ICCPR. As discussed in Chapter II Article 2(3) of ICCPR requires that states provide 
an effective remedy for violations of rights contained in that instrument. The optional 
protocol cannot provide an enforceable domestic remedy let alone provide for damages as 
BORA and UKHRA does. The current access to a remedy for an infringement of 
internationally recognised human rights in Australia falls far short of what is provided for in 
other jurisdictions.  
A federal HRA would allow international precedent involving human rights to play a more 
active role in the Australian Courts.
229
 The Canadian Supreme Court, The House of Lords 
and the New Zealand Court of Appeal have been developing jurisprudence around concepts 
of proportionality, limitation and interpretation which could be referred to in creating a 
federal HRA for Australia. This would cause Australian law to develop in a comparable 
manner to other similar democratic countries rather than allowing our human rights 
jurisprudence to remain sedentary.
230
  
                                                            
227 Ibid, 29.  
228 CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992. This case resulted in the federal government enacting the Human Rights Sexual Co 
duct Act 1994 (Cth) that legalised sexual relations between consenting adults throughout Australia, overriding 
archaic provision in Tasmania’s Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) (s 122(a), s 122(b) and s 123)  which 
criminalised sexual contact between consenting adult males. The UNHRC had held that such laws were an 
arbitrary interference with Mr Toonen’s right to privacy and had the effect of making him unequal before the 
law.  
229 ACTHRA s31(1) and VICHRA s 32(1) specifically state that international law and the judgements of 
domestic, foreign, international courts and tribunals relevant to a human right may be considered in interpreting 
a statutory provision. Such a provision should in included in a federal HRA 
230 Above n 3, 29.  
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The enactment of a federal HRA would also likely reduce criticism from UN treaty 
monitoring bodies and allow Australia to be seen as a legitimate contributor to the 
international human rights debate by enabling Australian Courts to comment on relevant 
rights issues.
231
 Both the UN Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights have been critical of Australia for failing to completely 
domestically implement rights and remedies under the relevant treaties they monitor. The 
absence of comprehensive legal framework at the federal level for the protection of human 
rights was the focus of their criticism.
232
 These should not be seen as reasons in themselves to 
enact a HRA,
233
 but rather they are positive corollaries resulting from providing human rights 
with greater legal protection. 
An Australian charter of rights may also serve to educate the majority of the Australian 
public about what rights are actually afforded protection in Australian law. Improvements in 
human rights education would also lead to an improved rights culture as the bureaucracy 
becomes more appreciative of human rights when providing public services.
234
 It may be 
difficult for citizen to accurately identify what rights they actually enjoy when they are 
scattered throughout statute and the common law. A 2006 survey found that the majority of 
Australians thought their human rights were already protected by a charter or bill. After being 
informed of the absence of an Australian charter of rights an even higher majority indicated 
they would be in favour of such an instrument.
235
 The 2009 NHRCC found a very high level 
of community support in favour of enacting a charter of rights or a human rights act for 
                                                            
231 Above n 153, 277-8.  
232 Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the 
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee- Australia, UN Doc CCPR/C/AUS/Co/5 
(2009). Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Considerations of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights- Australia (22 May 2009). 
233 Michael Kirby, ‘Consensus and Dissent and the Proposal for an Australian Statute of Rights’ (2008) 12 
Southern Cross University Law Review 129, 145.  
234 Above n 115, 35.  
235 Above n 193, 67-8.  
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Australia,
236
 identifying that public opinion supports the arguments in favour of a human 
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Chapter IV: The Arguments against a HRA 
This chapter will critically examine the main arguments that oppose the enactment of a HRA 
for Australia. Many of the arguments share similarities to arguments that opposed the 
enactment of a constitutionally embedded bill of rights for Australia. The flaws in these 
arguments will be identified in order to illustrate that a dialogue model federal HRA 
represents the best practice for rights protection in Australia.   
 
 Current Human Rights Protection is Adequate 
Opponents of a HRA would suggest that current human rights protection in Australia is 
adequate and that our democratic institutions are well equipped to defend the individual 
rights of citizens.
237
 As stated in the introduction human rights, at a federal level, are 
protected by three instruments: 
- The Constitution 
- The Common Law 
- Commonwealth legislation.238 
The constitution protects very few rights and those that it does purport to protect are given 
limited scope.
239
 It is important to remember that the Constitution was never intended to 
preserve and enshrine the rights of the Australian people but rather share power between the 
                                                            
237 Julian Leeser, ‘Responding to some Arguments in Favour of a Bill of Rights’ in Ryan Haddrick and Julian 
leeser (eds), Don’t Leave Us with the Bill: The Case Against an Australian Bill of Rights (The Menzies 
Research Centre Limited, 2009) 31, 52-6. 
238 The free and independent press that operates in Australia is also seen as an institution that aids in preserving 
the freedoms of citizens.  
239 Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116 and Krygger v Williams 
(1912) 15 CLR 366 both reveal that freedom of religion has been offered very narrow protection. The right to 
trial by jury under s 80 of the Constitution has been described as practically worthless as it only applies to 
charges made on indictment coupled with the fact the majority of criminal prosecution occur in the jurisdiction 
of the states. Geoffrey Sawyer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (Melbourne University Press, 1967) 19. 
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Commonwealth and the States.
240
 One prevalent issue that surrounded federation was the 
retention of adequate powers for the states, namely the ability to legislate restrictively in 
regards to local Aboriginal populations and to restrict the rights of other non-Europeans.
241
 
 The Tasmanian Attorney General at the time of the first and second Constitutional 
Conventions, Inglis Clark, can be credited as the main proponent for the inclusion of express 
rights in the constitution. Clark envisioned a provision that would provide equal protection 
under the law for all Commonwealth citizens, however this was to only survive the drafting 
process as the weak s 117 which prohibits discrimination only on the basis of state 
residency.
242
 Robert Garran, who chronicled the federation debates, dismissed the idea of 
securing human rights protection in the Constitution stating that they were ‘an interference 
with state rights, on behalf of popular rights: an interference undoubtedly justifiable, if 
necessary, but if not necessary, better dispensed with’.243  Given the weak protection offered 
by the express rights and the move away from creating implied rights which the High Court 
experimented with in the 1990’s, it is clear that the Constitution cannot serve as an effective 
instrument for protecting human rights due to the restrictive nature in which the High Court 
has interpreted the human rights it protects.
244
 
The manner in which the common law protects rights is mainly through a developed doctrine 
of statutory interpretation.
245
 This has been described both as a ‘common law bill of rights’ or 
‘the principle of legality’. Given the lack of an Australian HRA, with an interpretive 
                                                            
240 Above n 3, 6. 
241 Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Who Wins under a Bill of Rights?’ (2006) The University of Queensland law Journal 
39, 40.  Examples would include the denial of mining licenses to Asian and African migrants without 
government permission and the arbitrarily unfair tests imposed by the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth),  
242 Above n 2, 62-6. 
243 Robert Garran, The Coming Commonwealth: An Australian Handbook of Federal Government (Kessinger 
Publishing, 1897) 173.  
244 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Australian Constitution in Retrospect and Prospect’ in Geoffrey Lindell (eds), 
Reflections on the Australian Constitution (Federation Press Sydney, 2003) 216-7. The Australian Constitution 
has been described as frozen instrument when compared to the judicial development of human rights that has 
occurred in other common law countries.  
245 James Spigelman, ‘The Common Law Bill of Rights’ in Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights: 
McPherson Lecture Series (University of Queensland Press, 2009), vol 3, 9.  
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provision that requires consideration of protected human rights when interpreting statute, the 
principle of legality remains the main tool by which the judiciary can defend the protection of 
human rights.
246
 The principle of legality provides that when interpreting legislation a court 
will not impute an intent to abrogate fundamental rights unless there appears an express intent 
to do so.
247
 The High Court expressed this principle in Potter v Minahan,
248
 and it was 
reinforced more recently in Coco v The Queen.
249
 Gleeson commented about the principle of 
legality, stating:  
Courts will decline to impute to parliament an intention to abrogate or curtail fundamental human rights or 
freedoms unless such an intention is clearly manifested by unambiguous language, which indicates that 
parliament has directed its attention to the rights and freedoms in question, and has consciously decided 
upon abrogation or curtailment.250 
Despite the presumption given to fundamental rights provided by the principle there is 
uncertainty regarding what actually constitutes a fundamental human right?
251
 An example of 
this can be seen from Australian Crime Commission v Stoddart,
252
 in which the High Court 
determined that no distinct or separate privilege existed against spousal incrimination in 
common law.
253
 The decision shows the difficulty of solely developing rights at common law 
as invariably the only tool a judge has at his or her disposal is the judicial history surrounding 
an alleged fundamental human right.
254
 A HRA would not suffer from this impediment as it 
would specifically list the human rights that are to be protected thus removing uncertainty as 
to what human rights are to be considered fundamental.  
                                                            
246 Wendy Lacey, Implementing Human Rights Norms: Judicial Discretion & Use of Unincorporated 
Conventions (Presidian Legal Publications, 2008) 49.  
247 Above n 14, 85-6.  
248 (1908) 7 CLR 277.  
249 (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437.   
250 Murray Gleeson, ‘The Meaning of Legislation: Context, Purpose and Respect for Fundamental Rights’ 
(2009) 20 Public Law Review 26, 33.  
251 Dan Meagher, ‘The Common Law Principle of Legality in the Ages of Rights’ (2011) 35 Melbourne 
University Law Review 449, 457-9.  
252 (2011) 244 CLR 554.  
253 Ibid, 571.  
254 Above n 14, 100.  
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The principle of legality and HRAs operate with the same interpretive presumption. Arguably 
HRAs codify and strengthen this principle by requiring that Courts consider interpretations 
that are in keeping with protected human rights even when legislation is unambiguous. When 
taking into account the other rights dialogue mechanisms contained in HRAs it is highly 
likely that a federal HRA would provide a more extensive and detailed procedure for 
protecting rights than that offered by the principle of legality.
255
 The principle of legality will 
be defeated by any express of implicit parliamentary desire to restrict rights, effectively 
preventing any judicial rights interpretation.
256
 This would not be the case under a HRA that 
requires the interpretation of all legislation with reference to protected rights.
257
 
As discussed in Chapter III a number of commonwealth anti-discrimination statutes and other 
pieces of legislation serve to protect human rights in the federal jurisdiction. However these 
protections are ad hoc in nature, do not fully implement internationally recognised human 
rights norms and contain numerous provisions that limit their operation. Either on their own 
or in combination with the Constitution or the principle of legality, these statutes cannot serve 
to protect human rights to an adequate standard. An instrument that encourages dialogue in 
order to promote human rights protection is needed,
258
 before the methods of human rights 
protection in Australia could be described as adequate. 
Some senior political figures (Robert Menzies, John Howard) have maintained that human 
rights in Australia are protected through the system of responsible and representative 
government laid out in the Constitution. This principle provides that executive government is 
responsible to parliament which in turn is responsible to the electorate who can exercise their 
displeasure against government action by voting against and hopefully defeating unpopular 
                                                            
255 Above n 14, 109.  
256 Above n 16, 49.  
257 A provision that allows parliament to suspend the operation of a HRA such as that which exists under 
VICHRA (s 31) would weaken any potential HRA and make it more akin to the principle of legality.  
258 Anthony Gray, ‘Constitutionally Protecting the Presumption of Innocence’ (2012) 31(1) University of 
Tasmania Law Review 132.  
61 
 
Ewen Mitchell 31820249 Honours Thesis 
governments.
259
 Sir Robert Menzies commented on this principle stating ‘In short, 




Despite the praise the principle of responsible and representative government has received in 
the past it can no longer be said to adequately protect human rights (if it ever could). It 
merely reinforces the notion of parliamentary sovereignty, which if coupled with a 
parliamentary monologue over rights dialogue does not offer best practice for rights 
protection. The notion of parliamentary supremacy may also hide the notion of executive 
supremacy, a body that may be placed under less scrutiny than the parliament, nor can it be 
said to be more trustworthy than the judiciary.
261
  Additionally elections occur far too 
infrequently to properly bring governments to account. Succinct criticism of this outdated 
principle was supplied by Debeljak:  
There is no guarantee that the majority will act in the best interests of others, particularly minority groups, 
the marginalised or the unpopular. Human rights concerns are unlikely to be the motivating force behind 






                                                            
259 Above n 16, 46-7.  
260 Sir Robert Menzies, Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth (Cassell & Company Ltd, 1967) 54.  
261 John Uhr,’ The Performance of Australian Legislatures in Protecting Rights’ in Tom Campbell, Jeffery 
Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds), Protecting Rights Without a Bill of Rights institutional Performance 
and Reform in Australia (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006) 41, 56.   
262 Above n 16, 47.  
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The Human Rights Record 
We are in no particular need of foreign jurisprudence. We have a well-developed domestic sense of human 
rights. The danger here is that an inferior, or less well developed, view of human rights could be picked up in 
Australia.263 
This quote from the former Prime Minister displays an opinion that human rights in Australia 
are well protected and attract higher standards of protection than that afforded to them in 
other countries. There is a measure of truth to this statement in the sense that Australia is by 
no means the worst violator of human rights. There is also compelling argument to suggest 
that Australia’s democratic institutions have weathered the challenges since federation well, 
upholding a high standards of human rights protection as most political and social conflicts 
have been addressed via the rule of law and without recourse to violence.
264
 However 
Australia cannot be described as a leader in the defence of human rights, perhaps at only one 
time displaying notable courage in defending human rights.
265
 While resistance to change is 
instinctive of the ‘if it ain’t broke don’t fix it’ argument is a poor argument against the 
creation of an Australian HRA,
266
 as achieving excellence in human rights protection should 
be a goal of every democracy. Australia should be prepared to accept the jurisprudence 
developed in other jurisdictions that protect human rights to a higher standard than that 
currently enjoyed in Australia. It is bizarre to pretend that Australia is isolated from the rest 
of the world and cannot seek to improve domestic methods of human rights protections from 
observing international examples.  
                                                            
263 John Howard, ‘Don’t Risk What We Have’ in Ryan Haddrick and Julian Leeser (eds), Don’t Leave Us with 
the Bill: The Case Against an Australian Bill of Rights (The Menzies Research Centre Limited, 2009) 67, 71.  
264 George Brandis, ‘The Debate we didn’t have to have: The Proposal for an Australian Bill of Rights’ in Ryan 
Haddrick and Julian Leeser (eds), Don’t Leave Us with the Bill: The Case Against an Australian Bill of Rights 
(The Menzies Research Centre Limited, 2009) 17, 17.  
265 Above n 214, 145 .The refusal to ban the communist party is the one example of multiple groups and 
institutions in positively defending human rights when the trend in other western democracies was contrary to 
this.  
266 Geoffrey Robertson, ‘The Statute of Liberty How Australians can take back their rights’ (Random House 
Australia Pty Ltd, 2009) 93.  
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Opponents of enacting an Australian HRA identify that the human rights consultation reports 
carried out by the states, territories and the federal government in the previous decade 
consistently recognised four areas in which concern about human rights was expressed:  
- Industrial Relations 
- Migration Detention 
- Anti-Terrorism Laws 
- The Northern Territory intervention.267 
Issues in these areas of consternation were apparently addressed through the legislative and 
democratic processes without the presence of a HRA and represented reasonably attempts to 
balance rights.
268
 However the arguments suggesting that recent human rights infringements 
were adequately remedied are exceptionally weak and fail to address the reasons 
infringements occurred in the first place. 





 Arguing that the eventual receipt of a Visa by Mr Al-Kateb 
demonstrates the effectiveness of Australia’s democratic institutions in protecting human 
rights is baselessly without merit. Mandatory detention is still a reality under the Migration 
Act and the potential for further human rights violations fuelled by the strict wording of that 
statute remains.
271
 UNHCR guidelines provide that detention of refugees should only occur in 
                                                            
267 Above 218, 35.  
268 Mr Al-Kateb was eventually given a visa and other individuals who were unlawfully detained or deported 
(Cornelia Rau, Vivian Solon) were given significant compensation. Workchoices was replaced by the Fair Work 
Act 2009 (Cth). Anti-terrorism legislation was justified and received bi-partisan support. The Northern Territory 
intervention was an attempt to protect the rights of vulnerable children in remote communities.  
269 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Opened for Signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered 
into force 22 April 1954). 
270 Above n 16, 345.  
271 As argued in Chapter III a federal HRA would allow the judiciary to consider rights interpretations at first 
principles even when legislation is unambiguous. This would reduce the potential for interpretations that are 
inconsistent with human rights and when human rights inconsistent interpretations are not possible then the 
legislature would be put on notice through dialogue to reconsider the negative effects of an infringing statute.  
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exceptional circumstances,
272
 yet in Australia immigration detention remains arbitrary and 
discriminates on a number of grounds.
273
 Continued indefinite detention does not serve any 
legitimate aim either assisting in immigration control or acting as a deterrent to those who 
seek asylum by unsafe means.
274
 A system that possessed the ability to assign indefinite 
detention that was not directed at any legitimate aim could not be said to give rise to an 
adequate human rights record. Arbitrary detention has increased negative consequences on 
the vulnerable, particularly those with mental health issues,
275
 potentially giving rise to 
additional human rights violations.
276
 Since Al-Kateb the protection attached to individual 
liberty by High Court jurisprudence has continued to weaken with only one justice (Heydon) 
expressing dissent in Haskins v Commonwealth,
277
 against the validity of detention ordered 
by an invalidly created court.
278
  
When constructing and applying anti-terrorism legislation it is critical to adhere to human 
rights principles in order to maintain the moral high ground against those who actively seek 
to disregard them.
279
 Anti-terrorism legislation is often presented as a necessary trade-off 
between national security and human rights,
280
 for national security to be adequately 
                                                            
272 Office of the UNHCR, UNHCR’s Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention 
of Asylum Seekers (February 1999) Guideline 3.  
273 Above n 16, 346. Immigration detention could also be argued to be discriminatory on the grounds of 
nationality, race or religion. There is a correlation between groups held in immigration detention and specific 
nationalities, ethnicities and religions given that these migrants come from areas where acquiring an Australian 
visa may be unattainable.  
274 Above n 16, 346-7. 
275 Kathy Eagar and Janette Green, ‘The Health of People in Australian Immigration Detention Centres’ (2010) 
192(2) Medical Journal of Australia, 65-70. 
276 When migration detention is applied arbitrarily it has an increased negative effect on the vulnerable, such as 
children or those with mental illness. This gives potential for Article 7 (prohibition on cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment) of ICCPR to be breached. 
277 (2011) 244 CLR 22.  
278 Steven Churches, ‘The Silent Death of Common Law Rights’ (2013) 20 Australian Journal of Administrative 
Law 64, 65.  
279 John Von Doussa, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism: A Crucial Challenge’ (2006) 13 
James Cook University Law Review 104, 105.   
280 Such legislation often includes provisions that allow preventative detention and controlled orders that restrict 
individual movement or association. Control orders are created by Division 4 of the Criminal code Act 1995 
(Cth) when a designated Court determines an individual is likely to engaged in terrorism related activity in the 
foreseeable future and Division 5 allows preventative detention orders when a subject is likely to engage in an 
act of terrorism in the immediate future. These provisions were inserted by the Anti-Terrorism Act [No 2 ] 2005 
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maintained there must be a corresponding decrease in the protection attached to human rights. 
The removal of normal procedural safeguards that surround the imposition of a control order 
raise serious human rights concerns.
281
 The case of Thomas v Mowbray illustrated these 
concerns as Jack Thomas was acquitted of all terrorism charges yet was still made subject to 
restriction imposed by a control order, essentially subverting double jeopardy. Such use of 
control orders could be considered arbitrary and not connected to any legitimate policy or 
legislative objective. UN commentary was to affirm that control orders could not serve to 
replace detention and are only permissible in certain circumstances.
282
 The Anti-Terrorism 
Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) has received ample criticism for the restrictions it places on rights 
noting the example of Mohammed Haneef,
283
 who was detained and interrogated upon what 
was revealed to be unconvincing evidence.
284
 
Preventative detention orders also raise a number or serious human rights concerns.
285
 No 
legal challenge can be issued at the initial detention order and it may be more appropriate to 
charge with a terrorism offence given the weight of evidence needed to impose a detention 
order.
286
 Given the restrictive nature of the anti-terrorism provisions in the Criminal Code 
1995 (Cth) it is hard to argue that Australia’s human rights record in this area justifies the 
arguments against enacting a HRA. A federal HRA would provide another check on the 
power of the executive and parliament which is of critical importance in terms of creating 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
(Cth). Such mechanism potentially infringe multiple human rights including freedom of movement, right to 
respect for private life and the right to a fair trial. 
281 The hearing is held ex parte, notice of hearing is only two days, civil standard of proof applies to an 
application for the continuation of a control order, a summary and not full reasons for the decision are supplied 
and relevant evidence may be withheld if its disclosure may prejudice national security.  
282 Martin Scheinin, Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Australia; Study on Human Rights 
Compliance While Countering Terrorism, UN Doc A /HRC/4/26/Add.3 (14 December 2006) para 37.   
283 Haneef v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 161 FCR 40. 
284 Above n 14, 47.  
285 Paul Fairall and Wendy Lacey, ‘Preventative Detention and Control Orders Under Federal Law: The Case for 
a Bill of Rights’ (2007) 31(3) Melbourne University Law Review 1072, 1077-9.   
286 Above n 16, 436. 
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balanced anti-terrorism legislation which may be motivated by reactionary concerns that do 
not appreciate the human rights impact of such legislation.
287
 
The Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth) was the federal 
government’s response to the Wild/Anderson Report which was set up to investigate 
allegations of child abuse in Aboriginal communities. The ‘Northern Territory intervention’ 
involved centralising a number of powers into the commonwealth’s hand,288 and additional 
disallowed the Racial Discrimination Act from applying to it whilst also reducing the 
protections and rights provided by other acts including the Native Title 1993 Act (Cth) .
289
 
This intervention invoked significant public debate as it did not specifically address the 
concerns identified in the Wild/Anderson report and restricted a number of human rights. The 
intervention disempowered individuals and the community (particularly restricting access to 
property) in the targeted area and did not seem to address the concerns raised in the report in 
a proportionate manner. 
290
 Such a flagrant disregard for human rights perpetuated by the 
federal government does not indicate that Australia possesses a strong human rights record 





                                                            
287 This is being written at a time when new anti-terrorism legislation is being moved through the federal 
parliament that would significantly expand the powers of the Australian Federal Police. Daniel Hurst, ‘Anti-
terrorism Bill: Police to get power to secretly search suspect’s house’ The Guardian (online), 9 October 2014 < 
http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2014/oct/09/anti-terrorism-bill-police-to-get-power-to-secretly-
search-suspects-house>.  
288 These included the acquisition without compensation of all Aboriginal Land without compensation and the 
substitution of five year leases for 99 year leases.   
289 Above n 11, 771. 
290 Above n 11, 772-3.  
67 
 
Ewen Mitchell 31820249 Honours Thesis 
Politicisation of the Judiciary 
A common criticism of charters or statutes of rights is that they pervert the traditional power 
exercised by the judiciary as it sidelines the position of both the executive and parliament in 
attempting to deliver justice efficiently
291
. The interpretative provision allows judges to 
effectively rewrite legislation thus frustrating the supremacy of parliament.
292
 Given that 
judges are not elected and are therefore not accountable to constituents or before parliament 
(question time and committees are the measures through which members of the executive are 
accountable to parliament) it may not be appropriate for them to make law instead of merely 
interpreting it. Whether legislation is rights compatible and whether restrictions on rights are 
reasonable are questions that will be left to the unelected judiciary.
293
 Speaking about 
interpretations made by the House of Lords under the UKHRA, Professor James Allen was to 
comment:  
The most senior judges of what was once considered to be the most interpretively conservative court in the 
common law world now tell us they can give other statutes, statutes they concede would otherwise be clear 
and unambiguous, the exact opposite meaning as that intended by the elected parliament.294  
In forming interpretations with a power that authorises judicial lawmaking it is feared that 
judges would be unduly influenced by this new ability. Judicial activism would become a 
reality as judges would not evenly apply legal principles but instead be influenced by their 
personal opinions when they are consistently exposed to questions of a political and social 
                                                            
291 Gerard Brennan, ‘The Impact of a Bill of Rights and the Role of the Judiciary: An Australian Perspective’ in 
Phillip Alston (ed), Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights (Oxford University press, 1999) 454, 463.  
292 Christian Porter, ‘Pluralism, Parliamentary Democracy and Bills of Rights’ in Ryan Haddrick and Julian 
Leeser (eds) Don’t Leave us with the Bill: The Case Against an Australian Bill of Rights (The Menzies Research 
Centre Ltd, 2009) 127, 139.   
293 James Allen, ‘What’s Wrong About a Statutory Bill of Rights’ in Ryan Haddrick and Julian Leeser (eds) 
Don’t Leave us with the Bill: The Case Against an Australian Bill of Rights (The Menzies Research Centre Ltd, 
2009) 83, 85.  
294 Ibid, 87.  
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nature.
295
 The transfer of legislative power to the judiciary is a violation of the democratic 
process as the elected representatives have abdicated their responsibility to develop policy 
and legislation best suited for the majority.
296
  
The politicisation of the judiciary is not an acceptable risk in attempting to reduce the 
negative rights based consequences that can result from strict majoritarian government.
297
 
Another criticism is that the legislature will feel compelled to respond positively to 
declarations of incompatibility and acquiesce to all judicial decisions that involve human 
rights determinations, effectively creating a judicial monologue,
298
 an outcome that is not a 
goal of the dialogue model HRA. The high response rate of the UK parliament to declarations 
of incompatibility (discussed in chapter III) may offer some support to the argument that 
statutory charters of rights actually create a judicial monologue.
299
 
In spite of these concerns there is significant evidence that Australian courts have made 
numerous determinations that have had extensive policy consequences in their development 
of the common law. It has done so without the presence of a HRA indicating that it has 
always been in the purview of the courts to interpret statute and develop the common law 
with reference to human rights.
300
 The case of Mabo v Queensland (No 2),
301
 is an excellent 
example of this as the High Court recognised that native title rights existed at common law 
and struck down the long standing doctrine of Terra Nullis as it perpetuated an immoral 
principle no longer supported by community standards. Justice Brennan commented that the 
law could be modified in order to make it conform to contemporary standards of human 
                                                            
295 Ian Callinan, ‘In Whom Should we Trust’ in Ryan Haddrick and Julian leeser (eds), Don’t Leave us with the 
Bill: The Case Against an Australian Bill of Rights (The Menzies Research Centre ltd, 2009) 73, 81-2.  
296 Above n 161, 9.  
297 Tom Campbell, ‘Does anyone win under a Bill of Rights? A Response to Hilary Charlesworth’s ‘’Who Wins 
under a Bill of Rights’’’ (2006) University of Queensland law Journal 55, 60.  
298 Christopher Manfredi and James Kelly, ‘Six Degrees of Dialogue: A response to Hogg and Bushnell’ (1999) 
37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 513, 520-1.   
299 James Allan, ‘The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: Exegesis and Criticism’ (2006) 
30 Melbourne University Law Review 906, 914.   
300 Above n 229, 46.  
301 (1992) 175 CLR 1.  
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rights.
302
 This decision has had long lasting policy effects, influenced the creation of native 
title legislation and was made without reference to an existing HRA. The destruction of the 
Terra Nullis myth should not be replaced by the fallacy that the judiciary cannot be active in 
securing better protection of human rights.
303
 
Despite concerns that judges would go ‘mad with power’ if Australia was to enact a HRA, 
the argument of improper judicial lawmaking is difficult to maintain given the experience in 
other jurisdictions.
304
 The current balance of power surrounding human rights is weighted to 
heavily in favour of the legislature and a dialogue model HRA which grants extra tools to the 
judiciary is needed to create an equilibrium between the arms of government that results in 
best practice for human rights protection. The failure of successive federal governments to 
adequately protect human rights and implement international obligations into domestic law 
may have influenced the judiciary to comment about the need to address this imbalance.
305
 
Fairall and Lacey commented on this imbalance, stating:  
The situation in Australia is currently such that basic and fundamental freedoms are being eroded by a 
Parliament with increased legislative power and an all-powerful executive government with the political will 
to use them.306 
The argument that bills or charters of rights represent an antithesis to the traditional 
democratic process cannot strictly apply to legislative bills of rights. The Parliament retains 
the power to reject judicial interpretation of human rights and is even capable of amending or 
repealing the HRA instrument itself.
307
 At the time of writing there is heated debate 
                                                            
302 Ibid, 30.  
303 Above n 270, 1096.  
304 Above n 53, 28-9.  
305 Michael Kirby, ‘The Role of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights by Reference to International Human 
Rights Norms’ (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 514, 526. Anthony Mason made numerous references relating 
to the need for a constitutional or legislative bill of rights in order to address the growing imbalance of power 
between the arms of government (Michael McHugh has proffered similar arguments since his retirement from 
the High Court).  
306 Above n 271, 1098.  
307 Above n 229, 51.  
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surrounding the proposal that the UKHRA should be repealed, though it should be noted this 
has been an active issue for some time.
308
 The ultimate decision is always left to the 
parliament and the ‘weak’ form of judicial review offered by HRAs does not serve to 
invalidate infringing legislation but rather only brings infringements to the attention of 
Parliament and does not undermine the democratic process.
309
 HRAs do not transfer any 
power from the parliament to the judiciary but rather increase the accountability of 
parliament by granting the Courts tools with which the effects of legislation on human rights 
can be scrutinised.  
The relationship between human rights and democracy should not be an antagonistic one. 
Adequate protections of human rights are necessary to ensure that the autonomy of minorities 
are not trampled under the weight of majoritarianism and legal positivism. The judiciary is 
not politicised but is empowered to give a more robust consideration to human rights when 
interpreting statute and developing the common law. The jurisprudence of other jurisdictions 
can aid the Australian judiciary in the application of a potential HRA in order to placate 







                                                            
308 JC Finley, ‘Rights groups angered over David Cameron’s plans to repeal U.K’s Human Rights Act’ UPI 
(online) 3 October 2014 http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2014/10/03/Rights-groups-angered-over-
David-Camerons-plans-to-repeal-UKs-Human-Rights-Act/6751412332407/.   
309 Above n 184, 61-2.  
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Villain’s Charter and Excessive legislation 
 
Another argument against HRAs is that they tend to serve the interests of the unsound 
members of a community whilst doing little to protect ordinary citizens.
310
 Criticism has been 
made against the ACTHRA due to the prevalence of strict liability offences in territory law 
and its alleged inability to protect individuals from the actions of other individuals.
311
 The 
premise of this argument is that a requirement by judges to actively consider human rights in 
criminal matters will lead to fewer convictions. A HRA may weaken the protection the courts 
offer to the community as the interpretative provision requires that statute be interpreted as 
compatible with the right to a fair trial (except when parliament’s intent would be 
frustrated),
312
 potentially improving the chances of an accused to escape conviction when 
legislation is read down to be compatible with this right. An example would be a legislative 
provision that removed the presumption of innocence or imposed an evidentiary burden on 
the accused being interpreted to have less effect and scope then parliament intended.
313
  
In spite of fears of a HRA becoming a villain’s charter there is little evidence to suggest that a 
HRA will increase the number of acquittals based on technicalities or human rights 
considerations.
314
 Arguments relating to the admissibility of evidence or illegal conduct by 
police are frequently made in criminal matters and the inclusion of certain rights (privacy, 
fair trial) in a HRA arguably only represents a codification of existing safeguards in the 
                                                            
310 Bill Stefanik, ‘A Reflection on the ACT Human Rights Act 2004’ in Ryan Haddrick and Julian Leeser (eds), 
Don’t Leave us with the Bill; The Case Against an Australian Bill of Rights (The Menzies Research Centre 
Limited, 2009) 309, 313.  
311 Ibid 314-5.  
312 In the VICHRA this right is contained in s 25 Rights in criminal proceedings. It provides for the right to be 
presumed innocent until proven otherwise amongst other protections.  
313 The deeming provision considered in Momcilovic which reversed the presumption of innocence may have 
been read down as not applying to certain offences but ultimately a declaration of inconsistent interpretation was 
sought.  
314 Consultation Committee for a Proposed WA Human Rights Act (WA Committee), A WA Human Rights Act: 
Report of the Consultation Committee for a Proposed WA Human Rights Act (2007), 54-7.  
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criminal justice system.
315
 A five year review into the operation of the UKHRA found that it 




While courts must serve to protect the general interests of the community these interests must 
be balanced,
317
 against the need to protect individual’s human rights in criminal matters. 
Defendants can receive an acquittal based on reasons not related to their guilt or innocence 
regardless of whether a HRA exists that requires judges to consider human rights when 
administering a trial (allowing evidence, directions to the jury) and actually arise from 
legislative direction.
318
 The right that critics fear may unfairly protect alleged unsavoury 
individuals is the right to a fair trial. However what is often overlooked is that this right does 
not require procedures and practice that favour an accused. Justice Whelan commented in 
DPP v Mokbel,
319
 that interests of society in general and those affected by the trial other than 
the accused must be taken into consideration when determining fair conduct of a trial.
320
  
 The villain’s charter argument hides another benefit that HRAs can bring. They may act as a 
stimulus to review practices within the arms of government that may not conform to accepted 
levels of human rights protection and as such serve to correct defects in procedural law.
321
  
Concern has also been raise over whether BORA could be perceived by the New Zealand 
public to represent a villain’s charter.322 A number of cases invoked public criticism against 
                                                            
315 Ibid, 56.  
316 UK Department for Constitutional Affairs, Review of the Implementation of the Human Rights Act, July 
2006.  
317 Notable examples from the UK where individual rights were afforded protection include R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL 46 where the requirement for a member of the executive to 
determine minimum parole periods was determine to be incompatible with human rights. Also in R v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26 the practice of searching the legally privileged 
correspondence of prisoners in their absence was determined to unreasonably infringe human rights.    
318 Above n 54, 67.  
319 [2010] VSC 331 
320 Ibid, 161.  
321 Andrew Byrnes, ‘And some have bills of rights thrust upon them: The experience of Hong Kong’s Bill of 
Rights’ in Philip Alston (ed), Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives 
(Clarendon Press ,2000) 318, 345-6.  
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BORA including the staying of proceedings involving serious offences, the quashing of 
thousands of drink driving convictions due to failure of police to advise of the right to legal 
representation and the award of significant compensation to prisoners for perceived minor 
rights violations.
323
 If the dialogue coming from the public suggests dissatisfaction with the 
protection granted to human rights by the courts (amounting to rogue/villain’s charter 
criticism) then the parliament may respond to ensure,
324
 that the public does not lose faith in 
the benefits of a HRA.  This criticism can be balanced through the awareness of a HRA 
vindicating other important human rights.
325
 
 Concern also exists that a HRA would produce excessive legislation, choking the court 
system and consuming the finite resources needed to administer the justice system efficiently. 
A HRA may create new causes of action in civil matters and new defences in a criminal 
context as individuals would seek to invoke its protection in every possible circumstance.
326
 
Litigation could result from frivolous and unnecessary causes that seek to clarify protected 




This argument, which is linked to the argument of villain’s charter, has not been validated 
under existing HRAs in other jurisdictions as they have not resulted in an explosion of human 
rights based litigation.
328
 In its first seven years of operation the UKHRA was referred to in 
50 cases before the courts,
329
 an amount that can hardly be said to constitute an explosion of 
litigation. The argument that a HRA would serve to financially benefit lawyers through 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
322 Ivor Richardson, ‘The New Zealand Bill of Rights: Experience and Potential, Including the Implications for 
Commerce’ (2004) 10 Canterbury Law Review 259, 262.  
323 Above n 49, 28.  
324 Remembering that parliament retains supremacy under the dialogue model and can respond to dialogue.  
325 Above n 53, 28.  
326 Bill Stefaniak, ‘A Reflection on the ACT Human Rights Act 2004’ in Julian Leeser and Ryan Haddrick (eds), 
Don’t Leave us with the Bill: A Case against an Australian Bill of Rights (The Menzies Research Centre Ltd, 
2009) 309, 315.  
327 Above n 147, 291-2.  
328 Above n 147, 297.  
329 Above n 306, 59.  
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increased litigation is also seriously flawed as the perceived litigation increase is not a reality 
and the lawyers who engage in human rights are often junior practitioners on modest salaries 
serving in a community role or more senior practitioners working in a pro bono capacity.
330
 A 
provision that required an existing cause of action in law to be met before the protections 
under a HRA could be invoked would aid in assuaging fears of a HRA potentially creating a 
culture of litigation.  
A HRA may actually serve to decrease the amount of litigation that results from alleged 
human rights infringements. The mechanisms contained in a HRA that require the legislature 
to more carefully consider the human rights impact of potential legislation (parliamentary 
committee, members statement) would likely result in less legislation that unreasonably 
restricts protected rights. This would result in fewer matters concerning human rights coming 
before the courts due to the careful consideration parliament has had to apply to them 









                                                            
330 Above n 259, 158-60.  
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Chapter V: Implementing an Australian HRA: 
The final chapter will focus on what provisions should be included in an Australian HRA in 
order for it to provide best practice human rights protection. The HRAs operating in other 
jurisdictions and the specific legal context in Australia that were discussed in the previous 
chapters will form the basis for selecting content for an Australian HRA. The effect a HRA 
may have on administrative law will also be discussed and reasons for the continuing failure 
to create an Australian HRA will also be explored.  
 
What Human Rights to Protect? 
Whilst it is commonly accepted that an Australian HRA should protect all civil and political 
rights laid out in Part III of ICCPR and maintain the non-derogable status of the rights that 
Article 4(2) lists, the NHRCC recommended that economic, social and cultural rights (ESC) 
should not be protected under an Australian HRA or if they were to be included that they 
should not be justiciable.
331
 This position cannot be maintained if the goal of fully 
domestically implementing international human rights obligations is to be achieved. Both sets 
of rights have equal status in international law and the fulfilment of one category is closed 
linked to the other.
332
 
The argument against the inclusion of ESC rights suggests that it is not appropriate for Courts 
to make determinations in matters that include the allocation of significant government 
resources as the competing priorities encapsulated in such human rights would complicate 
                                                            
331 Above n 168, 366.  
332 Andrew Byrnes, ‘Second-Class Rights yet again? Economic Social and Cultural Rights in the Report of the 
National Human Rights Consultation’ (2010) 33(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 193, 195.  
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decision making.
333
 This argument fails to consider modern jurisprudence which contends 
that ESC rights can be justiciable both at the international,
334
 and domestic level.
335
 
Judicial remedies may be necessary in order for states to provide an effective remedy when 
ESC rights are violated in order that the human rights contained in ICSECR are adequately 
protected.
336
 Legislation may not provide complete protection for human rights, so generally 
worded provisions that allow Courts to provide judicial remedies for ESC rights will provide 
a safety net for the protection of those human rights.
337
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1996 (South Africa) under s 26(1) 
provides that everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. The following 
subparagraph clarifies that this is to be achieved via reasonable legislative or other measures 
taking into account the availability of resources in order to achieve progressive realisation of 
this human right. This represents a malleable test for determining whether ESC rights are 
being adequately protected. This test is similar to that of proportionality discussed in relation 
to civil and political rights but realises that ESC rights are competitive in nature as they are 
achieved through finite resource allocation and take time to be fully implemented. Some will 
be directly applicable to individuals, others can be analysed as to the reasonableness of their 
progressive implementation while others (due to the availability of resources) will be left 
entirely to the domain of the parliament and the executive.
338
 This is supported by general 
                                                            
333 Ibid, 199-200. 7 
334 The Optional Protocol to ICESCR allows individual communications to the ICESCR monitoring body 
(CESCR) to investigate and make recommendations from alleged nonfulfillment of ESC rights by member 
states. GA Res 63/117, UN GAOR, 63rd sess, 66th plen mtg, UN DOC A/RES/63/117 (5 March 2009).  
335 South African Courts have developed useful jurisprudence in implementing ESC rights without infringing on 
the powers of the legislature 
336 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 9: The Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, 19th sess, UN Doc E/C.12/1998/24 (3 December 1998) 9.  
337 Above n 324, 204.  
338 Above n 324, 205.  
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comment from Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights which identifies the 
rights protected under ICESCR as non-absolute.
339
 
The human rights that would be generally applicable under ICESCR would be the ones where 
immediate judicial action could result in realisation of them (right to form trade unions, 
public holiday pay). Other human rights which involve matters of policy best left to the 
executive or parliament may be outside the proper judicial process as they go beyond the 
appropriate consideration of reasonable allocation of resources in order to achieve 
progressive realisation. The Honk Kong Court of First Instance held that a challenge to the 
government’s air pollution policy could not be made under the right to health contained in 
ICESCR as this would involve interference in the political process.
340
  
Despite some divergent opinion on the judicial enforcement of ESC human rights, experience 
from other jurisdictions demonstrate that at least some of the human rights contained in 
ICESCR can be judicially enforced and others considered by the judiciary.
341
 The manner in 
which ESC rights are framed in the South African Constitution illustrates that the judiciary 
can make determinations relating to these human rights without entering a political area the 
public would not wish it to. Unfortunately consultations undertaken in Australia failed to 
properly consider the inclusion of ESC rights in human rights instruments,
342
 with the South 
African example being regarded as an exception.
343
 
The ACTHRA originally contained a provision that would have allowed for a review to 
consider the inclusion of ESC rights in the act yet to this date no such rights have been 
                                                            
339 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 18: Article 6 of the International 
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights , 35th sess, Un Doc E/C.12/GC/18 ( 6 February 2006).  
340 Clean Air Foundation Ltd v Government of the Hong Kong SAR [2007] HKCFI 757, 43.  
341 Above n 324, 208-9.  
342 State, territory and federal governments largely considered that ESC rights would have an uncertain effect 
and interfere in areas of policy. They failed to consider the limiting effect contained in the wording of s 26 of 
the South African Constitution.  
343 ACT Department of Justice and Community Safety, Parliament of ACT, Human Rights Act 2004: Twelve-
Month Review-Report (2006) 49.  
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inserted. ESC rights were to have been considered in reviews of a potential Tasmanian 
HRA,
344
 however such an instrument did not come to fruition. The  
WA consultation recommended the inclusion of ESC rights and that they be protected in the 
same manner as civil and political rights although noting that administrative rather that 
judicial review would represent a more acceptable model to the legislature.
345
 
Parliamentary reviews of the UKHRA were also to reject the traditional jurisprudence 
surrounding ESC rights (that they are inappropriate for judicial enforcement) recommending 
the inclusion of some ESC rights into the instrument, albeit in a qualified manner.
346
 This 
review and an additional 2008 review,
347
 recommended a model of progressive realisation for 
ESC rights with a limited role for the judiciary in reviewing government measures to 
implement these human rights that maintained separation of powers.
348
 
The recommendations of Australian consultations committees that HRAs should contain ESC 
rights, similar recommendations by UK parliamentary reviews and examples from the South 
African Constitution indicate that any potential federal Australian HRA should protect at 
least some of the human rights covered by ICESCR. The judiciary has a role to play in the 
determination of human rights that create a positive obligation on the government to provide 
adequate standards of living to its citizens. Courts do not lack the expertise to make 
determinations in this area as they have a long traditional of examining ESC rights including 
protecting tenants from unlawful evection, determining welfare entitlements and hearing 
claims of discrimination in education and the workplace.
349
 
                                                            
344 Tasmanian Law Reform Institute, A Charter of Rights for Tasmania, Final Report No 10 (2007) 122.   
345 Above n 309, 87.   
346 Joint Committee on Human Rights, The international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
House of Lord Paper 183, House of Commons paper No 1188, Session 2003-4 (2004), 22. 
347 Joint Committee on Human Rights, A Bill of Rights for the UK? A House of Lords Paper 165, House of 
Commons Paper 150, Session 107-08 (2008).  
348 Ibid 192.  
349 Above n 324, 203.  
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A federal HRA should protected all the human rights contained in ICCPR and ICESCR. ESC 
rights should be framed in similar manner to the South African model which provides for a 
circumscribed role for the judiciary where the availabilities of resources and the holistic 
approach of legislation and policy must be considered. If it were deemed unacceptable to 
include all ESC rights then those that can be addressed immediately by judicial remedy 
should be included, such as the right to fair remuneration and the right not to be deprived of 
property other than in accordance with the law.  
 
Provisions in a HRA 
The federal government’s response to the NHRCC report,350 rejected the dialogue model 
HRA recommended by the committee. However not all facets of the report were rejected and 
the federal government chose to create a Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights.
351
 
This committee scrutinises all legislative bills and instruments for compliance with the seven 
core international human rights treaties considered by the NHRCR.
352
 Such a body is a 
common feature in HRAs and an Australian federal HRA could amend the role of this 
committee to refer to the protected rights contained in a HRA rather than the broad ambit of 
treaties considered by the NHRCR. A provision that requires the minister responsible for a 
prospective bill to table a report indicating compliance or detailing any inconsistency with 
HRA rights should also be included.  
Despite the potential legal challenges discussed in Chapter II a HRA should provide the 
ability for the Federal and High Court to issue declarations of incompatibility when rights 
compatible interpretations cannot be provided to legislation. Waldon identified two reasons 
                                                            
350 Australia’s Human Rights Framework (2010); Robert McCelland, ‘Launch of Australia’s Human Rights 
Framework’ (Speech delivered at the National Press Club of Australia, Canberra, 21 April 2010).  
351 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth).  
352 Above n 341, 8.  
80 
 
Ewen Mitchell 31820249 Honours Thesis 
why the parliament and the courts may disagree about the application of rights. Parliament 
may believe that rights have no proper application in a given context contrary to judicial 
opinion (misgivings) or there may be disagreement as to the appropriate level of protection 
given to rights in specific contexts (disagreements).
353
 Whether the divergence of opinion is a 
misgiving or a disagreement the declaration of incompatibility mechanism provides an 
important dialogue tool to the judiciary that communicates to parliament that it should 
reconsider the negative impact of infringing legislation. To protect this mechanism from 
invalidation it should be drafted to join the Attorney-General as a party in proceedings where 
declarations are sought and make the declaration binding on the parties involved.
354
 This 
would allow the Attorney-General’s obligation of tabling a response before parliament to be 
enforced by injunction therefore increasing the possibility of the mechanism to be considered 
determinative of a matter and therefore a proper exercise of judicial power. 
The interpretative provision in an Australian HRA should allow the courts to interpret 
legislation where it is possible to do so with protected rights and not be subject to the doctrine 
of implied repeal. The judiciary should be able to consider the human rights impact of 
legislation even when its wording is not ambiguous, so long as an interpretation does not 
frustrate the purpose of a statutory provision.
355
 As discussed in chapter III an interpretation 
that did not allow for indefinite detention under the Migration Act would not have frustrated 
the legislative objective of efficiently managing migration to Australia and would have 
afforded greater justice in Al-Kateb.  
Any Australian HRA should not contain a general override provision such as that possessed 
by the VICHRA under s 31. An override provision will reduce the amount of helpful dialogue 
that is created between the judiciary and parliament as the parliament will become motivated 
                                                            
353 Jeremy Waldon, ‘Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators’ in Ian Brodie and Grant 
Hudscroft (eds), Constitutionalism in the Charter Era (LexisNexis Canada, 2004) 7.  
354 Above n 147, 327-9.  
355 Above n 21, 252.  
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by expediency and use the override mechanism rather than accepting judicial interpretation 
and then responding legislatively.
356
 This would serve to undermine dialogue (and rights 
protection) as the power of override suppresses informal dialogue that results from the back 
and forth between the parliament and judiciary.
357
 Limitation of rights should be confined to 
a general limitation provision similar to that contained in the VICHRA (does not apply to 
non-derogable rights) and specific limitations on individual rights when applicable 
(restricting the right to freedom of expression so individuals can defend their reputation 
through defamation actions). These can be referred to as external and internal limitations. The 
parliament should only be able to suspend the operation of a HRA by repealing the actual act 
itself and then suffering the public reaction from such a decision.
358
 
An Australian HRA should only apply to individuals and not corporations. Human rights are 
needed to protect the interests of individuals and it is rare that corporations would benefit 
from a HRA.
359
 An existing cause of action should be required before a remedy can be 
provided for a breach of human rights. This will help in assuaging fears that a HRA will 
result in a torrent of litigation and will also provide additional validity to the declaration of 
incompatibility mechanism. A remedy of damages should also be available as doing so would 
be in keeping with the requirements of ICCPR and send a strong message to both public 
authorities and the international community that breaches of human rights are to be taken 
seriously and victims are provided with an effective remedy.
360
 
A federal HRA should apply equally across Australia at the federal, state and territory levels. 
The need for human rights protection at the state and territory levels is of crucial importance 
                                                            
356 Above n 152, 342. s 
357 Connor Gearty, ‘Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and Human Rights’ (2002) 118 Law Review 
Quarterly 248, 254.   
358 A general override provision severely damages the ability of a HRA to protect human rights as reasonable 
limitations to human rights are not considered and non-derogable rights could be potentially overridden.  
359 Corporations may benefit from the right to privacy which would provide additional security to commercial 
activities or secrets.  
360 Above n 147, 337.  
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given the level of public services and the number of criminal prosecutions that occur in these 
jurisdictions. This uniformity will represent a desire to conform to international human rights 
norms and offer equal protection of rights throughout Australia. The downside of equal 
protection is that s 109 of the constitution will invalidate state legislation that unreasonably 
infringes protected human rights while similar federal legislation will remain valid, a 
situation not in keeping with the dialogue model.  
A provision stating that the federal HRA was not intended to cover the field may reduce the 
amount of state laws found inoperative and reduce the potential for the constitutional powers 
of the states to be restricted. This would also allow the states and territories to develop their 
own laws that protect human rights and are in keeping with international human rights norms. 
The states have been more proactive then successive federal governments in affording 
legislative protection to rights and they should not lose this ability. A federal HRA should 
also apply to the executive arm of government and all those who are contracted to provide 
public services.  
The enactment of a federal dialogue HRA will bring substantial benefits to the protection of 
human rights in Australia. Fewer pieces of commonwealth and state legislation will 
unreasonably infringe protected human rights and the dialogue surrounding human rights 
between the arms of government will become more transparent to the public. The judiciary 
will become empowered to actively consider human rights in its decision making and become 
a more active participant in human rights dialogue. A culture of human rights will develop in 
the public service as public authorities are required to account for the human rights 
implications of their decision making. Australia will no longer be isolated from international 
jurisprudence and become a more legitimate contributor to human rights dialogue in an 
international context.  
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Administrative Law and Human Rights 
A Federal HRA will impose substantive and procedural obligations on public authorities to 
both act compatibly with protected rights and properly consider,
361
 them in their decision 
making.
362
 Justice Emerton considered the obligations imposed by the term ‘proper 
consideration’ and concluded that it did not involve detailed legal analysis of protected rights 
but rather:  
It will be sufficient in most circumstances that there is some evidence that shows the decision-maker 
seriously turned his or her mind to the possible impact of the decision on a person’s human rights and the 
implication therof for the affected person, and that the countervailing interests or obligations were 
identified.363 
The countervailing interest and obligations would involve consideration of the desired impact 
of the legislation or policy being applied in the administrative decision and whether it was 
reasonable for them to trump individual rights in the circumstances.
364
 The identification of 
countervailing interests represents the substantive obligation imposed on public authorities 
when applying human rights to their decision making process. Justice Bell reinforced the 
judgement in Castles but noted that the obligation on a decision maker to properly consider 
human rights would not be discharged, no matter how genuine their decision, if it did not 
comply with the relevant limitation provision in the VICHRA.
365
            
                                                            
361 The ‘proper consideration’ obligation is contained in both VICHRA (s 38) and ACTHRA (s 40B) and 
reduces evidentiary complications when courts attempt to review whether public authorities have acted 
compatible with protected rights.  
362 Joanna Davidson, ‘Incorporation of Human Rights in Administrative Decision-Making: The Impact of 
Human Right Instruments in Victoria and the ACT’ (68) Australian Institute of Administrative Law February 
2012, 44. Legislation must be given effect if it is incompatible with protected rights as the dialogue model 
preserves parliamentary sovereignty.  
363 Castles v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2010] VSC 310, 186.  
364 In this case the reasonableness of the limitation would have been found be weighing up the individual’s 
rights against the limitation factors found in s 7(2) VICHR 
365 PJB v Melbourne Health (Patrick’s Case) [2011] VSC 327, 312.  
84 
 
Ewen Mitchell 31820249 Honours Thesis 
The possible effect of a HRA on administrative law has caused some concern regarding the 
proper role of the judiciary as it expands the scope with which administrative decisions can 
be reviewed allowing the concept of proportionality and the balancing of competing interests 
to be applied to such decisions. A concept of deference can be developed to maintain the 
separation between the judiciary and the executive and prevent administrative law descending 
into unprincipled merits review.
366
 The concept of deference is important as it is 
inappropriate for an appeal of a decision made on a proportionality ground to succeed merely 
because those reviewing it form a different opinion as to the whether rights were reasonably 
limited in the circumstances (second guessing). The finding of an error of law, such as the 
application of an incorrect test, would be a more appropriate ground for overturning an 
administrative decision. Deference recognises that in some areas it is inappropriate for the 
judiciary to review decisions that are in the proper purview of the executive which is better 
suited to balancing a wide variety of interests through applying proportionality.
367
  
When assessing proper consideration of human rights a court is likely to place significant 
weight on the original decision makers reasoning if it can be showed they engaged in a 
weighing up exercise of the outcomes of their decision. The High Court has already 
recognised the importance of considering the original decision makers reasoning if it is well 
supported by relevant considerations and transparent.
368
  
An example of similar deference can be seen from the case of R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh 
High School,
369
 where the House of Lords was willing to give significant weight to the 
decision of a high school to disallow some religious dress from being acceptable uniform 
after a comprehensive consultation was undertaken with community and religious leaders in 
                                                            
366 Above 357, 48.  
367 R v Director of Public Prosecutions; ex parte Kebliene [2000] 2 AC 326, 381.   
368 Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission and Another (2000) 199 CLR 135, 
153.  
369 [2007] 1 AC 100.  
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choosing an acceptable uniform.
370
 In this instance the House of Lords recognised that the 
school governors were in a better position to balance competing interests (illustrated by the 
consultation) that a judicial body was. A similar position has been adopted by the Victorian 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal when considering s 38 of VICHRA (proper 
consideration),that deference be given to the original decision when it can be show that 




It has been submitted that the administrative law system in Australia serves as an effective 
protector of individual human rights and provides effective recourse to citizens when these 
rights are infringed.
372
 An analysis of the administrative law as an effective method of human 
rights protection is beyond the scope of this thesis. However it is submitted that a HRA will 
improve the ability of administrative law in protecting human rights as decisions makers 
would need to properly consider human rights and courts could scrutinise decisions against 
their impact on human rights.
373
 The principle of deference will prevent judicial review under 
a HRA entering the area of executive power, augmenting the administrative law in protecting 





                                                            
370 Ibid 116.  
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The Absence of a HRA 
As mentioned previously Australia remains one of the only democratic countries without any 
bill or charter of rights either statutory or constitutional in nature. There may be a number of 
reasons that explain, but do not excuse, this gap in human rights protection.  
Discussion surrounding human rights in England first began in earnest with the publication of 
William Blackstone’s Commentaries in 1753.374 The influence of Blackstone was to spread to 
British colonies including Australia and the 13 American colonies. The concept of rights was 
to play a dominant part in the drafting on the U.S constitution but was beginning to fade from 





reaction away from human rights may be attributed to the upheaval wrought by the French 
revolution which championed the abstract rights of man and the emergence of Jeremy 




Legislatures guided by majoritarian principles would become the norm in both Britain and 
Australia, they would not protect human rights in a legal positive sense for another 200 years. 
The Magna Carta and the Bill of rights 1689 should not be seen as true human rights 
instruments due to their conservative nature and the emphasis they placed on limiting royal 
but not parliamentary power (rather they served as a catalyst for the common law to expand 
its scope of human rights protection).
377
 The inheritance of legal positivism from Britain may 
have engendered Australian jurisdiction to be sceptical of human rights instruments both 
legislative and constitutionally entrenched.  
                                                            
374 Chapter one of the first book is entitled ‘Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals’ and deals with civil and 
political rights.  
375 James Spigelman, ‘Blackstone, Burke, Bentham and the Human Rights Act 2004’ (2005) 26 Australian 
Business Law Review 1, 2.  
376 Ibid 2-3.  
377 Above n 11, 139.  
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Another reason for the lack of a rights charter in Australia may be the antagonistic struggle 
engaged in by the two major political parties over the issue. The Australian Labour Party 
(ALP) has traditionally been in favour of the introduction of a human rights instrument 
having made multiple attempts through legislation or constitutional amendment (see 
introduction). H.V Evatt, a prominent ALP figure post World War Two, helped in drafting 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and stressed the importance of international 
treaties in protecting human rights.
378
 On the other hand the Liberal Party of Australia has 
been opposed to any HRA or constitutional amendment to entrench human rights. Both 
Robert Menzies and John Howard fervently opposed any charter of rights for Australia 
believing that the concepts of representative democracy and responsible government provided 
adequate human rights protection. 
The divergent stance by the two major political parties over the adoption of a charter of rights 
has caused all attempts to introduce one at the federal level to be frustrated be heated 
parliamentary debate and effective public counter campaigns.
379
 The only human rights 
instrument to be successfully introduced was the Human Rights Commission Act 1981 (Cth) 
by the Fraser liberal government which despite being a positive step was criticised by the 
ALP who continued to favour a bill of rights.
380
 
The potential legal challenges to a HRA identified in Chapter II may represent another reason 
why successive federal governments have lacked the political to enact holistic statutory 
human rights protection. The declaration of incompatibility mechanism and the interpretation 
provision are the most contentious elements and may cause invalidation due to breach of the 
separation of powers doctrine. However invalidation is not certain and it would appear more 
likely than not that a HRA would survive constitutional challenge given the available 
                                                            
378 Annemarie Devereux, Australia and the Birth of the International Bill of Human Rights 1946-1966, (The 
Federation Press, 2005) 1.  
379 Above n 11, 143-8.  
380 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 8 November 1979, 2093.  
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guidance from other jurisdictions chiefly regarding allowable interpretations and the ability to 
make declarations of incompatibility binding on the parties involved. The level of public 
support should motivate parliament to ‘bite the bullet’ and enact a federal HRA despite the 
perceived challenges. 
The above reasons may offer some explanation as to why Australia remains alone in not 
possessing a bill or charter of rights but they do not provide legitimate reasons for the 
continuing lack of such an instrument. The historical/cultural, political and legal 
(questionable) reasons that run counter to a HRA appear frivolous next to the benefits that 
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2014 should have been an historical year for human rights protection in Australia. This year 
marks the 10
th
 anniversary of the ACTHRA and the eight year review into the operation of 
the VICHRA. Also 2014 would have seen a review of the 2009 National Human Rights 
Consultation Report which had recommended the creation of a dialogue model federal HRA 
for Australia. This recommendation was rejected by the Rudd government in favour of the 
watered down National Human Rights Framework which included some recommendations 
from the NHRCR. However under the current Liberal Coalition it is unlikely the findings of 
the report will be revisited. An opportunity was missed by not enacting a HRA in 2009 
following the release of the NHRCR which recommended such a model.
381
 
Human rights protection in Australia remains incomplete. The constitution and the common 
law are not effective protectors of human rights due to the lack of express rights protection 
contained in the constitution and the ability of parliament’s will to subordinate the common 
law. The protection of human rights through federal legislation remains at best a patchwork 
system that fails to domestically incorporate the complete range of internationally recognised 
human rights protections. Due to these failings human rights violations have occurred within 
Australia and the potential remains for further violations if this imbalance in human rights 
protection is not addressed. Former members of the High Court have expressed frustration 
that traditional methods of statutory interpretation coupled with ill-conceived federal 
legislation have resulted in unreasonable restrictions on human rights.  
A dialogue model HRA would provide the judiciary with the tools to address the imbalance 
that exists in the protection of human rights whilst not infringing the separation of powers 
that exists in Australia. This model would allow the courts to interpret unambiguous 
legislation in a human rights compliant manner except where to do so would frustrate the 
intent of the legislature. The declaration of incompatibility mechanism allows the judiciary to 
                                                            
381 The National Human Rights Framework appears to have been abandoned by the current federal government.  
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communication to the legislature that it may wish to reconsider a legislative provision that it 
believes unreasonably infringes protected human rights.  Parliament would be forced to 
scrutinise potential legislation for human rights infringement and only limit protected human 
rights in reference to reasonable proportional restrictions. The actions of parliament in 
limiting human rights would become more transparent and face repercussions from the public 
if they could not be determined to be reasonable. Public authorities would have to account for 
human rights in their decision making, helping to develop a culture of rights in the public 
service. A dialogue model HRA would send a strong message to the international community 
that Australia is committed to protecting human rights and prevent Australia from becoming 
further isolated from developing international jurisprudence surrounding human rights. All 
these are positive effects that result from the enactment of a HRA and would represent a 
higher standard of human rights protection in Australia.  
A dialogue model HRA represents best practice for the protection of human rights in 
Australia. The federal government, or a future federal government, should follow the 
example set by Victoria and the ACT and enact a HRA. This instrument should be based on 
the UKHRA and BORA models and include the provisions best suited for an Australian 
context. The protection of human rights should never be dominated by a political agenda and 
after a period on inactivity the need to review Australia’s lack of human rights protection has 
come again. The benefits that can be wrought under a HRA are numerous, eclipse any alleged 
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